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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Kareem Harry, Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002161 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from Horry County 

Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27724 

Heard November 30, 2016 – Filed July 19, 2017 

AFFIRMED 
Meliah Bowers Jefferson, of Wyche, P.A., of Greenville, 
and Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of 
Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy 
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant 
Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and 
Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of 
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Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of 
Conway, for Respondent. 
JUSTICE KITTREDGE: Petitioner Kareem Harry was convicted of murder, 
under the theory that the "hand of one is the hand of all," for his role in a failed 
attempt to recover a television.  The court of appeals affirmed, holding the trial 
court properly denied Petitioner's motion for a directed verdict.  State v. Harry, 413 
S.C. 534, 776 S.E.2d 387 (Ct. App. 2015).  We issued a writ of certiorari to review 
the court of appeals' decision and now affirm. 
I. 
This tragic story culminates with an attempt by Petitioner and his enlisted cohorts 
to retrieve Petitioner's forty-seven-inch plasma-screen television from Kevin 
Bowens (Victim).  Victim was shot and killed on his property by one of Petitioner's 
accomplices during the confrontation.  The State contends the evidence 
demonstrates that Petitioner intended to retrieve his television by any means 
necessary, including the use of force.  According to the State, Victim's death was 
therefore a natural and foreseeable consequence of Petitioner's plan to retrieve his 
television and, under the theory of accomplice liability that says the hand of one is 
the hand of all, Petitioner is guilty of murder.  Petitioner counters that he only 
wanted to peacefully reclaim his television, he had no idea his accomplice was 
armed, and he actually tried to be a calming influence when the situation became 
tense. In light of the differing inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, we 
emphasize that because we are reviewing a directed verdict motion, we are 
required to "'view[] the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the State.'" State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 235, 781 S.E.2d 352, 353 
(2016) (quoting State v. Butler, 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2014)).
A. 
The chain of events leading to Victim's death began about nine months before the 
murder.  During this time, Petitioner had an abusive, on-again, off-again romantic 
relationship with Ashley Bledsoe, with whom he temporarily resided in Surfside 
Beach. The weekend before the shooting, police responded to Bledsoe's residence 
to investigate allegations that Petitioner had assaulted Bledsoe during an argument.  
Petitioner fled through a bedroom window, leaving behind a coat in which the 
police found cocaine. Petitioner also left behind personal belongings, including his 
15 

  
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                            
 
 
 
television. 
The day after her argument with Petitioner, Bledsoe met Victim, a drug dealer who 
lived in Murrells Inlet, and the two spent the night together at Bledsoe's apartment.  
The following morning, Bledsoe agreed to give Petitioner's television to Victim in 
exchange for $400. Before leaving Bledsoe's apartment, Victim loaded the 
television into the backseat of his car, promising to return shortly with the cash.  
Victim did not return and never paid Bledsoe for the television.
By all accounts the television was lightweight.  Victim was able to lift it, load it 
into the backseat of his sedan, and unload it at his home without any assistance.  
Victim's girlfriend also testified that the television was not heavy, it did not require 
more than one person to lift, and she had been able to move it by herself.  As for 
how Victim had obtained the television, he explained to his girlfriend that "he had 
bought it off of somebody. . . .  [H]e had given them a little bit of money for it and 
that he had bought an ounce of weed at a really good price to make up the 
difference and that he still owed a little bit of money on it . . . ."   
At some point, Bledsoe's landlord learned police had found drugs in Bledsoe's
apartment and terminated the lease.  Bledsoe was required to vacate the premises 
and remove all belongings.  Bledsoe relayed the fact of the lease termination to 
Petitioner, who had personal property in the apartment.  Petitioner asked Sage 
McPhail, a drug customer of his who owned a pickup truck, to help move 
Petitioner's belongings from Bledsoe's apartment.1  The day before the shooting, 
Bledsoe met McPhail at her apartment and gave McPhail all of Petitioner's 
belongings—except, of course, for Petitioner's television, which she had sold to 
Victim.2 
When Petitioner discovered his television was not among the items recovered from 
Bledsoe's apartment, he contacted Bledsoe and demanded that she return the 
television or pay him for it.  Frightened that Petitioner might become violent 
toward her if he learned of her romantic encounter with Victim, Bledsoe lied and 
told Petitioner she had sold the television to a female friend for $400.  Petitioner 
1 McPhail occasionally performed odd jobs for Petitioner in exchange for cocaine 
or marijuana. 
2 There was also evidence Victim took drugs from Bledsoe's apartment that 
belonged to Petitioner. 
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reiterated his demand that Bledsoe return the television or give him the $400.   
The following day, Petitioner called and texted Bledsoe on ten separate occasions 
to inquire about the television, but Bledsoe never answered or responded.
Petitioner thereafter sent Bledsoe a text message stating, "I'm going to call the 
police if you don't give me my TV."  Desperate to appease Petitioner, Bledsoe 
texted Victim numerous times asking for the money and explaining that the 
television belonged to a friend, who was demanding payment and threatening to 
call the police.  At some point, Victim texted Bledsoe, "Stop letting that police shit 
scare you," but eventually Victim stopped responding to Bledsoe's text messages 
and telephone calls. Unable to get any response from Victim, Bledsoe told 
Petitioner the truth about the person to whom she sold the television and provided 
Petitioner with Victim's telephone number. 
Around 7:00 p.m. on the evening of the shooting, Bledsoe was running errands 
with her roommate in Murrells Inlet when she received a call from Petitioner, who 
demanded that she pull over immediately so he could pick her up and she could 
show Petitioner where Victim lived.  Petitioner's plan, as noted, was to retrieve 
either the television or the $400 Victim promised to pay for it.3  Bledsoe's 
roommate, who was driving, pulled over in the parking lot of Waccamaw Hospital, 
located just 2.9 miles from Victim's home, and a few moments later, Petitioner, 
who was driving McPhail's truck, picked up Bledsoe.4  Instead of proceeding 
directly to Victim's nearby home, Petitioner instead drove 16.3 miles to the Myrtle 
Beach home of his friends, and fellow drug dealers, Tommy Byrne and Saire 
Castro. 
Upon arriving at Byrne and Castro's apartment, Petitioner went inside while 
Bledsoe waited in the car. When Petitioner entered the home, Byrne and Castro 
were at the kitchen table, while Byrne's father was cooking dinner.  Petitioner 
summoned Castro into the living room and the two had a five- to eight-minute 
conversation, which Byrne could not overhear because he remained seated at the 
3 Petitioner apparently had a probation meeting the following morning and was in 
need of funds to pay probation-related fees. 
4 Earlier in the day, McPhail agreed to perform some minor automotive repairs on 
Petitioner's SUV in exchange for cocaine; since McPhail had to take the SUV to 
his uncle's shop in Loris (forty-five minutes away) to perform the work, McPhail 
left his truck for Petitioner to drive in the meantime.  
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kitchen table.5  Castro was told that, along with Petitioner's television, Victim had 
also stolen some drugs belonging to Petitioner that Petitioner had stored in 
Bledsoe's apartment (of which it appears Bledsoe was unaware).  Immediately 
following the conversation with Petitioner, Castro returned to the kitchen, asked 
Byrne if he wanted to "take a ride," and retrieved his (Castro's) handgun from
above a kitchen cabinet. Although there is no direct evidence that Petitioner or 
Byrne saw Castro retrieve his handgun, they both saw him go into the kitchen, and 
the evidence established it was well-known that Castro carried a gun.6 
Petitioner then returned to the pickup truck where Bledsoe was waiting, and Byrne 
and Castro got into Castro's sedan, with Castro behind the wheel.  With Petitioner 
leading the way in the pickup, the two vehicles caravanned 11.6 miles to Victim's 
home in the Burgess area of Murrells Inlet.  During the car ride, Castro informed 
Byrne the purpose of the ride was "to go collect a TV."   
At some point prior to arriving at Victim's home, Petitioner sent Victim a text 
message stating, "Meet me in Burgess."  Several minutes later, Petitioner called 
Victim's cell phone and the two had a brief conversation during which Petitioner 
made clear his intention to retrieve the television.  According to Victim's girlfriend, 
after receiving Petitioner's telephone call Victim became agitated and was unable 
to finish eating dinner. Instead, Victim got up from the dinner table and went into 
the master bedroom.     
A few minutes later, Victim's girlfriend looked out the window and saw 
Petitioner's caravan arriving at the couple's home.  She immediately rushed to the 
master bedroom to tell Victim that two vehicles had pulled into the yard.  Victim
tucked a handgun in the front of his pants and told his girlfriend he "would take 
care of it." Victim walked out into the driveway, leaned up against the side of his 
parked car, and stood with his arms crossed and the gun visible in his waistband.  
5 Byrne also testified that earlier that evening he had taken several Xanax pills (for 
which he did not have a prescription), and on a scale of one to ten, he was "about a 
seven" in terms of his level of intoxication.   
6 Several weeks prior to the shooting, Castro was arrested and charged with 
unlawful conduct toward a child when police found two semi-automatic guns and 
drugs in the car in which he was traveling with his child.  Petitioner admitted he 
was aware that Castro sold drugs and that just a few weeks prior to the shooting 
Castro had been arrested with guns and drugs.
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Although Victim was visibly armed, Petitioner and his cohorts exited their vehicles 
and formed a semi-circle around Victim.  Witnesses could not make out precisely 
what was said, but the ensuing conversation was loud and confrontational.   
By all accounts, Petitioner inquired several times about the television, and Victim
stated he had neither the television nor any money to give Petitioner.  At some 
point, Bledsoe got out of the truck and confronted Victim about "stealing" the 
television. After it became obvious that Petitioner was not going to obtain either 
his television or any money, Petitioner instructed Bledsoe to get back into the truck 
and "gave [Victim a] head nod."  Castro then pulled out his gun and shot Victim
three times. 
Immediately after the shooting, Petitioner jumped into the passenger side of the 
truck, pushed Bledsoe into the driver's seat, and instructed her to drive away.  
Approximately one mile from the scene of the shooting, police spotted the fleeing 
caravan, and after a brief chase, Bledsoe pulled over and surrendered.  However, 
before she could fully stop, Petitioner exited the vehicle through the passenger 
door and fled on foot to the home of a friend who lived nearby.  Petitioner used the 
friend's telephone to call his brother for a ride to Petitioner's ex-girlfriend's house 
in Socastee. 
Meanwhile, McPhail had completed the repairs to Petitioner's SUV and had driven 
to Petitioner's ex-girlfriend's home to return the SUV and retrieve his pickup.  
When he got there, his truck was gone and no one was home, so he leaned the seat 
back and fell asleep while waiting for Petitioner to arrive with the pickup.  McPhail
awoke to the sound of Petitioner knocking on the SUV's window, and Petitioner 
informed McPhail that "the cops got your truck."  Petitioner instructed his brother 
to drop McPhail off at Byrne and Castro's apartment so McPhail could give Castro 
a ride out of town. Before leaving, Petitioner instructed McPhail that "you ain't 
seen me." 
B. 
It is undisputed that Castro shot Victim, but because Petitioner was the only one 
who had any motive to confront Victim, the State theorized that he was the 
mastermind behind the incident.  Thus, Petitioner, Castro, Byrne, and Bledsoe 
were all charged with murder under the theory that the hand of one is the hand of 
all.7  Castro pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to thirty 
7 McPhail was charged with accessory after the fact to murder.  
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 years in prison, and Byrne and Bledsoe agreed to testify on behalf of the State at 
Petitioner's trial.   
 
At the close of the State's case, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict, arguing the 
State produced no evidence of a common design to undertake any illegal purpose.  
After the trial court denied Petitioner's motion, Castro and Petitioner both testified 
in Petitioner's defense; however, their accounts of the incident differed from each 
other and from the other witnesses in numerous key aspects.  Petitioner was 
convicted by the jury and sentenced to thirty-one years in prison.  The court of 
appeals affirmed. Harry, 413 S.C. at 542–43, 776 S.E.2d at 392.   
 
II. 
 
Petitioner contends the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial of his directed 
verdict motion, arguing that the State failed to produce substantial circumstantial 
evidence that Petitioner planned to confront or assault Victim, or otherwise 
intended any unlawful action that would foreseeably result in a violent 
confrontation. We disagree.   
          A. 
 
In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, the Court must view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the State.  E.g., Bennett, 415 S.C. at 235, 781 
S.E.2d at 353 (citation omitted).  "The Court's review is limited to considering the 
existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."  Id.  "When the evidence 
submitted raises a mere suspicion that the accused is guilty, a directed verdict 
should be granted because suspicion implies a belief of guilt based on facts or 
circumstances which do not amount to proof."  Id. at 236, 781 S.E.2d at 353. 
"Nevertheless," in reviewing the denial of a directed verdict motion, we are "not 
required to find that the evidence infers guilt to the exclusion of any other 
reasonable hypothesis."  Id. at 236, 781 S.E.2d at 354. 
 
Indeed, this Court emphasized in Bennett that "the lens through which a court 
considers circumstantial evidence when ruling on a directed verdict motion is 
distinct from the analysis performed by the jury."  Id. (citing State v. Littlejohn, 
228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924 (1955)).  "Within the jury's inquiry, 'it is necessary 
that every circumstance relied upon by the state be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt . . . .'" Id. (quoting Littlejohn, 228 S.C. at 328, 89 S.E.2d at 926). 
 
However, when ruling on a directed verdict motion, the trial court 
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and must 
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submit the case to the jury if there is "any substantial evidence which 
reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his 
guilt may be fairly and logically deduced."   
Id. at 236–37, 781 S.E.2d at 354 (quoting Littlejohn, 228 S.C. at 329, 89 S.E.2d at 
926). "Therefore, although the jury must consider alternative hypotheses, the court 
must concern itself solely with the existence or non-existence of evidence from 
which a jury could reasonably infer guilt." Id. at 237, 781 S.E.2d at 354. 
B. 
"'Under the hand of one is the hand of all theory [of accomplice liability], one who 
joins with another to accomplish an illegal purpose is liable criminally for 
everything done by his confederate incidental to the execution of the common 
design and purpose.'" State v. Thompson, 374 S.C. 257, 261–62, 647 S.E.2d 702, 
704–05 (Ct. App. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Condrey, 349 S.C. 
184, 194, 562 S.E.2d 320, 324 (Ct. App. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
"Mere presence and prior knowledge that a crime was going to be committed, 
without more, is insufficient to constitute guilt."  Id. at 262, 647 S.E.2d at 705. 
"However, 'presence at the scene of a crime by pre-arrangement to aid, encourage, 
or abet in the perpetration of the crime constitutes guilt as a [principal].'"  Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hill, 268 S.C. 390, 395–96, 234 S.E.2d 
219, 221 (1977)).
III. 
Therefore, to withstand Petitioner's directed verdict motion in the trial of this case, 
the State was required to produce evidence of Petitioner's presence at the scene of 
the shooting as a result of a prior arranged plan to undertake an illegal act, if 
necessary, to retrieve the television.  We agree with the court of appeals that the 
State presented sufficient evidence to survive the directed verdict motion.  The 
excellent opinion of the court of appeals analyzed the evidence appropriately in 
light of the applicable standard of review.  The dissent cites the proper standard of 
review, but rejects it in application, preferring instead to recast the evidence in a 
light favorable to Petitioner.
The State presented evidence that Petitioner had a history of violence and that 
Victim—who, like Petitioner, was a drug dealer—had not only slept with 
Petitioner's on-again, off-again girlfriend, but had also taken a television and drugs 
belonging to Petitioner without paying for them.  The State further produced 
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evidence that just before the shooting, instead of proceeding the 2.9 miles to 
Victim's house immediately upon picking up Bledsoe, Petitioner instead traveled 
16.3 miles to recruit Castro, who was known to carry a gun, and Byrne to 
accompany him as backup when he confronted Victim,8 despite the fact that the 
television was not so large or heavy that it required more than one person to carry.   
After Petitioner showed up unannounced at Byrne and Castro's home and conferred 
with Castro, Castro immediately armed himself and asked Byrne to join them.
Petitioner then led the caravan to Victim's house.  Prior to arriving at Victim's
home, Petitioner texted and called Victim to the point that Victim was too upset to 
finish eating dinner.  Once the caravan arrived at Victim's home, Petitioner, Castro, 
and Byrne continued with Petitioner's mission, notwithstanding the fact they could 
tell Victim was armed.  Further, even though Petitioner knew both sides of this 
confrontation were armed, his tone toward Victim was loud and heated, and 
according to Castro's own testimony, Petitioner "gave . . . [a] head nod" just prior 
to Castro firing the fatal shots.  Moreover, Castro and Petitioner left their vehicles 
running as they confronted Victim.  Following the shooting, Petitioner shoved 
Bledsoe into the driver's seat and forced her to drive the getaway vehicle, from
which Petitioner fled on foot after it was stopped by the police.     
Even without considering Petitioner's flight,9 the evidence yielded a reasonable 
series of inferences consistent with the State's theory—that Petitioner devised a 
plan to retrieve, by force if necessary, his television from Victim, a known drug 
dealer whom Petitioner and his accomplices knew was armed before exiting their 
vehicles. The State therefore presented sufficient evidence that Petitioner was 
engaged in a scheme to commit an illegal act, the result of which was Victim's 
shooting death, and the trial court properly denied Petitioner's motion for a directed 
verdict. 
IV. 
Because the court of appeals properly determined that the State presented sufficient 
evidence to withstand Petitioner's motion for a directed verdict, we affirm the court 
8 Petitioner then had to backtrack 11.6 miles to get from Byrne and Castro's 
apartment to Victim's home. 
9 "Evidence of flight has been held to constitute evidence of guilty knowledge and 
intent." State v. Beckham, 334 S.C. 302, 315, 513 S.E.2d 606, 612 (1999) (citing 
State v. Thompson, 278 S.C. 1, 10–11, 292 S.E.2d 581, 587 (1982)). 
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of appeals' decision. 
AFFIRMED. 
FEW, J., and Acting Justice Costa M. Pleicones, concur.  HEARN, J., dissenting 
in a separate opinion in which BEATTY, C.J., concurs. 
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JUSTICE HEARN: I respectfully dissent. Because the record contains no 
evidence of an illegal plan or purpose, I do not believe Appellant Harry's conviction 
under the theory of "hand of one is the hand of all" can stand. Therefore, I would 
reverse the trial court's denial of Harry's motion for directed verdict.  
Harry contends the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial of his 
directed verdict motion, arguing that the State failed to produce substantial 
circumstantial evidence that he planned to confront or assault the Victim or 
otherwise intended any unlawful action that would foreseeably result in a homicide.  
I agree. 
A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce 
evidence tending to prove every element of the offense charged. State v. Brannon, 
388 S.C. 498, 501, 697 S.E.2d 593, 595 (2010). In reviewing the denial of a directed 
verdict, "[t]he Court's review is limited to considering the existence or nonexistence 
of evidence, not its weight." State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 235–36, 781 S.E.2d 352, 
353–54 (2016) (citing State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593, 606 S.E.2d 475, 478–79 
(2004)). "When the evidence submitted raises a mere suspicion that the accused is 
guilty, a directed verdict should be granted because suspicion implies a belief of guilt 
based on facts or circumstances which do not amount to proof." Id. at 236, 781 
S.E.2d at 353–54 (citing State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 429, 753 S.E.2d 402, 409 
(2013)). Moreover, when co-defendants are not tried jointly and both the appellant 
and his co-defendant testify in his defense, an appellate court must consider all the 
evidence in the record to determine whether the trial judge erred in denying the
appellant's motion for a directed verdict. State v. Phillips, 416 S.C. 184, 195–97, 
785 S.E.2d 448, 453–54 (2016) (explaining the waiver rule adopted in Hepburn).
Harry was charged with and convicted of murder based on the accomplice 
theory, commonly referred to as "hand of one is the hand of all." Under this theory, 
"'one who joins with another to accomplish an illegal purpose is liable criminally
for everything done by his confederate incidental to the execution of the common 
design and purpose.'" State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 
(2010) (quoting State v. Condrey, 349 S.C. 184, 194, 562 S.E.2d 320, 324 (Ct. App. 
2002)) (emphasis added). In order to be guilty under this theory a defendant must
"be present at the scene of the crime and intentionally, or through a common design, 
aid abet, or assist in the commission of that crime through some overt act." Id.
(quoting State v. Langley, 334 S.C. 643, 648–49, 515 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1999)) 
(internal quotations omitted). Additionally, a defendant "'must be chargeable with 
knowledge of the principal's criminal conduct.'" Id. at 480, 697 S.E.2d at 584 
(quoting State v. Leonard, 292 S.C. 133, 137, 355 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1987)); see also
State v. Reid, 408 S.C. 461, 473, 758 S.E.2d 904, 910 (2014) ("[P]roof of mere 
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presence is insufficient, and the State must present evidence the participant knew of 
the principal's criminal conduct."). This Court has explained that in order for a 
defendant to have the requisite knowledge: 
"the alleged accomplice must have acted with the intention of 
encouraging and abetting the commission of the homicide, or, at least 
that the commission of the murder by the principal must have been a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's actions." 
Mattison, 388 S.C. at 484, 697 S.E.2d at 586 (quoting 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide §
26 (2010)) (emphasis added).   
I am troubled by the State's application of the "hand of one is the hand of all" 
theory to this case. This theory of accomplice liability is most frequently utilized in 
the context of burglary or robbery cases in which there is typically strong 
circumstantial evidence of a plan to perpetrate an illegal act. See, e.g., Barber v.
State, 393 S.C. 232, 234–36, 712 S.E.2d 436, 437–38 (2011) (Barber was convicted 
of criminal conspiracy, murder, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
violent crime inter alia for planning and perpetrating a burglary with three other 
men, although there were only two weapons and it was uncertain which two of the 
defendants were actually armed and which one shot and killed the victim.); Rivera
v. State, 382 S.C. 606, 608, 677 S.E.2d 596, 597 (2009) (Rivera was charged with
murder and armed robbery under the "hand of one is the hand of all" theory where 
Rivera did not actively participate in the robbery and murder, but "accompanied the 
active participants to the scene with knowledge that they intended to commit the
robbery."). After an extensive review of the cases involving accomplice theory, I
am unaware of any case in which a defendant was convicted under similar 
circumstances to those present in this case, i.e., in the course of retrieving property 
which was rightfully his.
Furthermore, I believe the facts in People v. Miller—an unpublished opinion 
from the California Fourth District Court of Appeal—are distinguishable and the 
court of appeals' reliance on that case misplaced. See State v. Harry, 413 S.C. 534, 
541–42, 776 S.E.2d 387, 391–92 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Miller, No. E040249, 2008 
WL 1899560 (Cal. Ct. App. April 30, 2008)).  The defendant in Miller admitted his 
purpose in going to the victim's home was to confront the victim, fully anticipating 
there would be an altercation. There, the defendant Miller was angry with the victim 
for refusing to give Miller's sister a quote on a new air conditioner. When Miller 
went to the victim's house to confront him, the two argued loudly, cursing at one 
another, and eventually began fighting. During the altercation, Miller's friend, 
Baillie, pulled his gun and fired seven shots, killing the victim and seriously injuring 
another bystander. A few days later, Miller turned himself in and gave a videotaped 
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statement to the police. In his statement, Miller admitted that his purpose in going 
to the victim's house was to confront the victim and he anticipated there would be 
an altercation. Additionally, Miller acknowledged he brought Baillie because he 
knew that Baillie and the victim were not on good terms and "Baillie would back
him up if he needed help fighting [the victim]."  Miller, 2008 WL 1899560 at *1–2. 
By contrast, Harry never admitted to having an illegal purpose in going to see 
the victim, but instead consistently maintained that his sole intent was to retrieve his 
television. See, e.g., Holliday v. Poston, 60 S.C. 103, ---, 38 S.E. 449, 450 (1901) 
(Gary, J., concurring) (stating the longstanding equitable principle "that if a stranger 
in possession of my property undertakes to sell it, and delivers it accordingly, it is at 
my option either to pursue the property in the hands of the holder" or to bring an 
action to recover the proceeds of the sale). Moreover, none of Harry's alleged  
accomplices—including Bledsoe and Byrne who were witnesses for the State— 
testified that Harry expressed or indicated any plan other than to lawfully recover 
his television. 
Viewing the record in the light most favorable the State, I find the evidence at
most establishes the following: (1) while he was only a few miles from the victim's 
home, Harry learned Bledsoe had sold the television to the victim; (2) rather than 
driving there immediately, Harry drove out of his way to pick up his friend Castro 
from Byrne's house;10 (3) Harry and Castro spoke for about 5 minutes in Byrne's 
house; (4) as Harry was exiting the house, Castro invited Byrne to come along for a 
ride; (5) Castro retrieved his gun, unseen by either Harry or Byrne; (6) when they 
arrived at the victim's house, Harry asked for the television and the victim refused
to give him the television or any money; (7) Bledsoe began yelling at the victim, 
accusing him of stealing the television and lying; and (8) Harry attempted to calm
Bledsoe and began walking her back to the truck when Castro shot the victim. While 
the testimony evidenced a plan between Harry and Castro, there is nothing illegal in 
requesting that a friend accompany you to recover your own property. Indeed, when
pressed  by the members of  this Court at oral argument, the State was unable to 
articulate what illegal purpose Harry might have had. Instead, the State repeatedly 
asserted that it is illegal to recover personal property when doing so will result in a
10 The State repeatedly asserted the fact that Harry drove so far out of his way to pick 
up Castro and Byrne before going to see the victim is evidence Harry anticipated 
there would be an altercation with the victim and wanted to bring Castro and Byrne
as back-up. However, the only testimony regarding why Harry drove all the way to
Myrtle Beach first was from Harry himself, in which he testified he was in no rush 
to pick up the television and he wanted to buy some marijuana from Byrne or Castro, 
both drug dealers, to smoke with Bledsoe later that evening.
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breach of the peace. However, this argument assumes, again without any evidentiary 
basis, that Harry intended or knew a breach of the peace would occur during his 
interaction with the victim. Moreover, even if Harry knew Castro carried a gun, that 
fact would still not be sufficient circumstantial evidence in my view to establish an 
illegal purpose. 
Based on the record, I find no evidence Harry intended anything more than to 
retrieve his television nor is there any evidence he was aware of any illegal intent on 
Castro's part in accompanying him. Therefore, I respectfully dissent because I
conclude Harry was entitled to a directed verdict.  
BEATTY, C.J., concurs. 
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JUSTICE FEW: This is a challenge to the registration provisions in the Surface 
Water Withdrawal Act.  The plaintiffs claim those provisions are an 
unconstitutional taking, a violation of due process, and a violation of the public 
trust doctrine.  The circuit court granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs 
on the grounds the case does not present a justiciable controversy, both because the 
plaintiffs lack standing and the dispute is not ripe for judicial determination.  We 
affirm.   
I. The Surface Water Withdrawal Act 
The Surface Water Withdrawal, Permitting, Use, and Reporting Act regulates 
surface water withdrawals in South Carolina.  S.C. Code Ann. §§ 49-4-10 to -180 
(Supp. 2016). Surface water is defined as "all water that is wholly or partially 
within the State . . . or within its jurisdiction, which is open to the atmosphere and 
subject to surface runoff, including, but not limited to, lakes, streams, ponds, 
rivers, creeks, runs, springs, and reservoirs . . . ."  § 49-4-20(27).  The Department 
of Health and Environmental Control is charged with the implementation and 
enforcement of the Act.  § 49-4-170.  The Act establishes two mechanisms to 
regulate surface water withdrawals—a permitting system and a registration system. 
A. Permitting System 
The Act requires most "surface water withdrawers" to obtain a permit before 
withdrawing surface water.  § 49-4-25.  A "surface water withdrawer" is defined as 
"a person withdrawing surface water in excess of three million gallons during any 
one month . . . ." § 49-4-20(28).  A permit applicant must provide detailed 
information to DHEC about the proposed surface water withdrawal.  § 49-4-80(A).  
DHEC must provide the public with notice of a permit application within thirty 
days, and if residents of the affected area request a hearing, DHEC must conduct 
one. § 49-4-80(K)(1). If DHEC determines the proposed use is reasonable, DHEC 
must issue a permit to the applicant.  §§ 49-4-25, -80(J). In making its 
determination of reasonableness, DHEC is required to consider a number of 
criteria. § 49-4-80(B).1  Permits are issued for a term of no less than twenty years 
1 Subsection 49-4-80(B) sets forth the criteria for determining reasonableness: (1) 
minimum instream flow or minimum water level and the safe yield; (2) anticipated 
effect of the proposed use on existing users; (3) reasonably foreseeable future need 
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and no more than fifty years.  § 49-4-100(B).  After a permit is issued, surface 
water withdrawals made pursuant to the terms and conditions of the permit are 
presumed to be reasonable.  § 49-4-110(B). 
B. Registration System 
Agricultural users are treated differently under the Act.  "[A] person who makes 
surface water withdrawals for agricultural uses[2] at an agricultural facility[3]" is 
classified as a "Registered surface water withdrawer," § 49-4-20(23), and is not 
required to obtain a permit, § 49-4-35(A).4  Instead, agricultural users simply 
register their surface water use with DHEC and are permitted to withdraw surface 
water up to the registered amount.  § 49-4-35(A). Because agricultural users are 
exempt from the permit requirement, their surface water use is not subject to the 
subsection 49-4-80(B) reasonableness factors. 
The Act establishes two ways for agricultural users to register their water use with 
DHEC—one for users who were already reporting their use to DHEC when the Act 
was rewritten in 2010,5 and one for users who were not yet reporting their use.  For 
for surface water; (4) reasonably foreseeable detrimental impact on navigation, fish 
and wildlife habitat, or recreation; (5) applicant's reasonably foreseeable future 
water needs; (6) beneficial impact on the State; (7) impact of applicable industry 
standards on the efficient use of water; (8) anticipated effect of the proposed use 
on: (a) interstate and intrastate water use; (b) public health and welfare; (c) 
economic development and the economy of the State; and (d) federal laws and 
interstate agreements and compacts; and (9) any other reasonable criteria DHEC 
promulgates by regulation.  § 49-4-80. 
2 "Agricultural use" is defined broadly to include the preparation, production, and 
sale of crops, flowers, trees, turf, and animals.  § 49-4-20(3). 
3 "Agricultural facility" is also defined broadly.  § 49-4-20(2). 
4 As section 49-4-25 indicates, there are other exceptions to the permit requirement 
"provided in Sections 49-4-30, 49-4-35, 49-4-40, and 49-4-45." The exception for 
agricultural users is provided in section 49-4-35. 
5 The Water Use Reporting and Coordination Act was originally enacted in 1982, 
Act No. 282, 1982 S.C. Acts 1980.  It was completely rewritten in 2010 and 
renamed the Surface Water Withdrawal, Permitting, Use, and Reporting Act, Act 
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those already reporting, the Act allows the user to "maintain its withdrawals at its 
highest reported level or at the design capacity of the intake structure" and the user 
is deemed registered. § 49-4-35(B).  For users who were not yet reporting their 
use, the Act requires the user to report its anticipated withdrawal amount to DHEC 
for DHEC to determine whether the use is within the "safe yield" of the water 
source. § 49-4-35(C). Safe yield is defined as,    
[T]he amount of water available for withdrawal from a 
particular surface water source in excess of the minimum
instream flow or minimum water level for that surface 
water source. Safe yield is determined by comparing the 
natural and artificial replenishment of the surface water 
to the existing or planned consumptive and 
nonconsumptive uses. 
§ 49-4-20(25). After DHEC determines whether the anticipated withdrawal 
amount is within the safe yield, it "must send a detailed description of its 
determination to the proposed registered surface water withdrawer."  § 49-4-35(C).   
The Act grants DHEC oversight over registered withdrawals.  Subsection 49-4-
35(E) provides, 
The department may modify the amount an existing 
registered surface water withdrawer may withdraw, or 
suspend or revoke a registered surface water withdrawer's 
authority to withdraw water, if the registered surface 
water withdrawer withdraws substantially more surface 
water than he is registered for or anticipates withdrawing, 
as the case may be, and the withdrawals result in 
detrimental effects to the environment or human health. 
§ 49-4-35(E). 
Registration has three effects important to the plaintiffs' claims in this case.  First, 
unlike permits, which are issued for a term of years, registrations have no time 
limits.  Compare § 49-4-35(C) (allowing registered users to continue making 
withdrawals "during subsequent years" with no reference to time limits), with § 49-
No. 247, 2010 S.C. Acts 1824-49. The 1982 Act provided for a regulatory 
"reporting system for agricultural users."  1982 S.C. Acts at 1982.   
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4-100(B) (establishing time limits for permits).  Second, the Act presumes all 
registered amounts are reasonable.  § 49-4-110(B). Third, the Act changes the 
standard of proof for private causes of action for damages by requiring plaintiffs to 
show a registered user is violating its registration.  Id.
II. Procedural History 
The plaintiffs own property along rivers or streams in Bamberg, Darlington, and 
Greenville counties. In September 2014, they jointly filed this action against 
DHEC in Barnwell County, challenging the Act's registration system for 
agricultural users in three ways.  First, they claim the registration system is an 
unconstitutional taking of private property for private use.  See S.C. CONST. art. I, 
§ 13(A) ("private property shall not be taken for private use").  Second, they claim 
the Act violates their due process rights by depriving them of their property 
without notice or an opportunity to be heard.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 
("No state shall . . . deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of law 
. . . ."); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("nor shall any person be deprived of . . . property 
without due process of law"). Finally, they claim the Act violates the public trust 
doctrine by disposing of assets the State holds in trust.  See S.C. CONST. art. XIV, 
§ 4 ("All navigable waters shall forever remain public highways free to the citizens 
of the State . . . ."); Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., 318 S.C. 119, 128, 456 
S.E.2d 397, 402 (1995) (stating "the state owns the property below . . . a navigable 
stream . . . [as] part of the Public Trust").
The plaintiffs and DHEC filed motions for summary judgment.  The circuit court 
granted summary judgment in favor of DHEC after finding the plaintiffs did not 
have standing and the case was not ripe.  The circuit court also addressed the 
merits of the plaintiffs' claims.  The court ruled the Act's registration process was 
not an unconstitutional taking because the plaintiffs were not deprived of any 
rights. Likewise, the circuit court held that without a deprivation of rights, there 
could be no violation of due process.  The circuit court held the public trust 
doctrine was not violated because the plaintiffs had not lost their right to use the 
waterways or been injured by any withdrawals.  The circuit court did not rule on 
DHEC's contention the claims were barred by the statute of limitations or that 
venue was improper. 
The plaintiffs appealed to the court of appeals and moved to certify the case to this 
Court pursuant to Rule 204(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  We 
granted the motion to certify.   
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III. Justiciability 
Our courts will not address the merits of any case unless it presents a justiciable 
controversy. Byrd v. Irmo High Sch., 321 S.C. 426, 430-31, 468 S.E.2d 861, 864 
(1996). In Byrd, we stated, "Before any action can be maintained, there must exist 
a justiciable controversy," and, "This Court will not . . . make an adjudication 
where there remains no actual controversy."  Id.; see also Peoples Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Res. Planning Corp., 358 S.C. 460, 477, 596 S.E.2d 51, 60 (2004) 
("A threshold inquiry for any court is a determination of justiciability, i.e., whether 
the litigation presents an active case or controversy.").  "Justiciability encompasses 
. . . ripeness . . . and standing." James v. Anne's Inc., 390 S.C. 188, 193, 701 
S.E.2d 730, 732 (2010). Standing is "a personal stake in the subject matter of the 
lawsuit." Sea Pines Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res., 345 
S.C. 594, 600, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001).  A plaintiff has standing to challenge 
legislation when he sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, actual 
prejudice or injury from the legislative action.  345 S.C. at 600-01, 550 S.E.2d at 
291. To meet the "stringent" test for standing, "the plaintiff must have suffered an 
'injury in fact'—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'"  345 
S.C. at 601, 550 S.E.2d at 291 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992)).6  We have
explained ripeness by defining what is not ripe, stating "an issue that is contingent, 
hypothetical, or abstract is not ripe for judicial review."  Colleton Cty. Taxpayers 
Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. of Colleton Cty., 371 S.C. 224, 242, 638 S.E.2d 685, 694 (2006).
Before we may determine whether the plaintiffs have presented a justiciable 
controversy, we must first understand their theory of how the Act has caused them
injury. Because their theory depends on their interpretation of the Act, we must 
then interpret the Act to determine whether they have properly alleged an "injury in 
fact" under it, Sea Pines, 345 S.C. at 601, 550 S.E.2d at 291, such that this case 
presents an "actual controversy" as opposed to one that is "contingent, 
hypothetical, or abstract," Byrd, 321 S.C. at 431, 468 S.E.2d at 864; Colleton Cty., 
371 S.C. at 242, 638 S.E.2d at 694.   
We review de novo the circuit court's ruling that there is no justiciable controversy.  
See Ex parte State ex rel. Wilson, 391 S.C. 565, 570, 707 S.E.2d 402, 405 (2011) 
(affirming the circuit court's order granting summary judgment on the basis of 
6 A plaintiff must show two additional elements not at issue in this case: causation 
and likelihood the injury can be redressed by the court's decision.  Id.
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justiciability where the ruling depended on statutory interpretation, and stating, 
"The construction of a statute is a question of law, which this Court may resolve 
without deference to the circuit court."). 
 
IV. The Plaintiffs' Theory of Injury 
 
The plaintiffs' claims of unconstitutional taking and violation of due process are 
based on their allegation the Act has deprived them of "riparian" rights.  The public 
trust claim, on the other hand, is based on the allegation the Act disposes of assets 
the State holds in trust for our citizens.   
 
A. Riparian Rights 
 
The property rights the plaintiffs allege have been taken from them under the 
registration provisions of the Act are known under the common law as riparian 
rights. The word riparian means "pertaining to or situated on the bank of a river, or 
a stream." 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters § 33 (2013). See also Riparian, BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("Of, relating to, or located on the bank of a river or 
stream").7  Under the common law, riparian property owners—those owning land 
adjacent to rivers or streams—hold special rights allowing them to make 
"reasonable use" of the water adjacent to their property.  White's Mill Colony Inc. 
v. Williams, 363 S.C. 117, 129, 609 S.E.2d 811, 817 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Lowe 
v. Ottaray Mills, 93 S.C. 420, 423, 77 S.E. 135, 136 (1913)).  We have described 
"reasonable use" as follows, 
 
All that the law requires of the party, by or over whose 
land a stream passes, is, that he should use the water in a 
reasonable manner, and so as not to destroy, or render 
7 The current editions American Jurisprudence and Black's Law Dictionary
recognize that some states include lakes and tidal waters within the definition of 
riparian. That is not true in South Carolina. In Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. 
State, 347 S.C. 96, 552 S.E.2d 778 (Ct. App. 2001), our court of appeals held 
"interests attached to property abutting an ocean, sea or lake are termed 'littoral.'"
347 S.C. at 108, 552 S.E.2d at 785 (citing Littoral, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th 
ed. 1990)); see also White's Mill Colony Inc. v. Williams, 363 S.C. 117, 129, 609 
S.E.2d 811, 817-18 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating "there is a distinction in classification 
that our courts have indicated a desire to strictly observe: owners of land along 
rivers and streams are said to hold 'riparian' rights, while owners of land abutting 
oceans, seas, or lakes, are said to hold 'littoral' rights").  
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useless, or materially diminish, or affect, the application 
of the water by the proprietor below on the stream . . . .   
 
White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 60 S.C. 254, 266, 38 S.E. 456, 460 (1901); see also 
Mason v. Apalache Mills, 81 S.C. 554, 559, 62 S.E. 399, 401 (1908) ("The 
different owners of land through which a stream flows are each entitled to the 
reasonable use of the water, and for an injury to one owner, incidental to the 
reasonable use of the stream by another, there is no right of redress.").   
 
Thus, the right of reasonable use is "subject to the limitation that the use may not 
interfere with the like rights of those above, below, or on the opposite shore."  
White's Mill Colony Inc., 363 S.C. at 129, 609 S.E.2d at 817 (citing Mason, 81 S.C. 
at 559, 62 S.E. at 401). Under the common law, if a riparian owner unreasonably 
interferes with another riparian owner's right of reasonable use, the injured owner's 
remedy is to bring an action for damages, or for an injunction, or both.  See 
McMahan v. Walhalla Light & Power Co., 102 S.C. 57, 59-61, 86 S.E. 194, 194-
95 (1915) (approving a jury charge on the right of reasonable use in a case where a 
downstream riparian owner sued an upstream riparian owner for damages); Mason, 
81 S.C. at 557, 62 S.E. at 400 (describing the downstream riparian owner's claim 
for an injunction against the upstream operator of a dam based on "the 
unreasonable use of the stream"); see also 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters § 53 (2013) 
("Interference with riparian rights is an actionable tort.  Any interference with a 
vested right to the use of water . . . would entitle the party injured to damages, and 
an injunction would issue perpetually restraining any such interference.").   
 
B. Public Trust Assets 
 
The Constitution of South Carolina provides, "All navigable waters shall forever 
remain public highways free to the citizens of the State and the United States."  
S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 4. Consistent with this provision, the State owns all 
property below the high water mark of any navigable stream.  Sierra Club, 318 
S.C. at 128, 456 S.E.2d at 402; see also McCullough v. Wall, 38 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 
68, 87 (1850) (stating "in this State all rivers navigable for boats are juris 
publici[8]"). Courts have long recognized this ownership as a trust.  In 1884, this 
Court held: 
8 See Juris Publici, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("Of public right; 
relating to common or public use"). 
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The state had in the beds of these tidal channels not only 
title as property, . . . but something more, the jus 
publicum,[9] consisting of the rights, powers, and 
privileges . . . which she held in a fiduciary capacity for 
general and public use; in trust for the benefit of all the 
citizens of the state, and in respect to which she had trust 
duties to perform. 
State v. Pac. Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50, 83–84 (1884); see also Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. 
State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53, 13 S. Ct. 110, 118, 36 L. Ed. 1018, 1042 
(1892) (recognizing this ownership as a "trust which requires the government of 
the state to preserve such waters for the use of the public"). 
We now call this the "public trust doctrine." See Sierra Club, 318 S.C. at 127-28, 
456 S.E.2d at 402 (discussing "the Public Trust Doctrine").  Under the public trust 
doctrine, the State "cannot permit activity that substantially impairs the public 
interest in marine life, water quality, or public access."  McQueen v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 354 S.C. 142, 149, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119-20 (2003).  The plaintiffs argue 
the Act violates the public trust doctrine by disposing of the State's water to 
agricultural users. According to the plaintiffs, "the State has lost complete control 
of registered amounts of water in perpetuity."   
V. The Nature of the Plaintiffs' Claims 
Having explained the plaintiffs' theory of injury, we turn now to the registration 
provisions of the Act to determine whether its terms support the plaintiffs' 
allegation of an injury in fact such that this case presents an actual controversy.   
A. The Takings and Due Process Claims 
The plaintiffs' takings and due process claims are based on their allegation that 
they have lost their riparian right to bring a challenge to another riparian owner's 
future unreasonable use. Significantly, the plaintiffs do not allege they have 
sustained any injury resulting from any withdrawal of surface water that has 
9 See Jus Publicum, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("The right, title, or 
dominion of public ownership; esp., the government's right to own real property in 
trust for the public benefit"). 
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already been made by an agricultural user.10  The allegation the plaintiffs do make 
is based on two provisions of the Act: (1) subsection 49-4-110(B), which states 
registered withdrawals are presumed to be reasonable and changes the standard of 
proof for private causes of action for damages, and (2) subsection 49-4-100(B), 
which requires permits must be issued for a specific term, but is silent as to time 
limits for registered uses.  The plaintiffs argue these provisions allow registered 
users to withdraw a fixed amount of water that will forever be deemed reasonable, 
which in turn prevents them from ever successfully challenging a registered 
agricultural use, regardless of how conditions may change in the future.  Based on 
this argument, the plaintiffs allege their "rights were fundamentally altered" the 
moment these provisions were signed into law,11 and thus they have suffered an 
"injury in fact" sufficient to establish standing, and have presented an actual 
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.   
We find the Act does not support the plaintiffs' allegations of injury.  First, we find 
nothing in the Act preventing the plaintiffs from seeking an injunction against a 
riparian owner for unreasonable use.  Prior to the Act, a riparian owner could bring 
an action challenging another riparian owner's unreasonable use and seeking an 
injunction. See Mason, 81 S.C. at 563, 558, 62 S.E. at 402, 400 (affirming the 
circuit court's order granting an injunction, as modified, against the upstream
operator of a dam based on "the unreasonable use of the stream").  After the Act, a 
riparian owner may still challenge another riparian owner's use as unreasonable— 
including a registered agricultural user.  If such a plaintiff can prove a registered 
agricultural use is unreasonably interfering with his right of reasonable use, and 
otherwise establish the elements for an injunction, then the plaintiff may be entitled 
to injunctive relief. 
Second, we find nothing in the Act preventing a riparian owner from filing a 
declaratory judgment action to protect his right of reasonable use.  Under section 
15-53-20 of the South Carolina Code (2005), courts have the "power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be 
claimed." A riparian owner may file a declaratory judgment action against 
registered agricultural users, and request the court declare their use unreasonable.  
While such a declaration may be of little value without an injunction, there is 
10 In response to a discovery request, the plaintiffs admitted "[their] property and 
[their] use thereof have not been injured due to any withdrawal of water for 
agricultural purposes occurring on a river or stream flowing past property that 
[they] own." 
11 The rewritten Act became effective on January 1, 2011.  2010 S.C. Acts at 1848.   
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nothing in the Act preventing the plaintiff from including DHEC as a defendant.  
This, in turn, could trigger DHEC's right to modify the registration under 
subsection 49-4-35(E).   
Third, we find nothing in the Act prohibiting private causes of action for damages 
against registered agricultural users.  In fact, the Act specifically contemplates such 
actions. Subsection 49-4-110(B) states, "No private cause of action for damages 
arising directly from a surface water withdrawal by a permitted or registered 
surface water withdrawer may be maintained unless the plaintiff can show a 
violation of a valid permit or registration."  § 49-4-110(B) (emphasis added).  
While this provision changes the standard of proof a plaintiff must meet in an 
action for damages, the right of action clearly still exists.  We are aware of no 
authority—and the plaintiffs cite none—for a finding that a change to the standard 
of proof in an action for damages deprives a future plaintiff of property rights 
under the takings or due process clauses.   
Finally, we find no support in the Act for the plaintiffs' argument that the 
presumption of reasonableness will prevent future plaintiffs from proving a 
registered use is unreasonable. Under the common law, the plaintiff has the burden 
of proving—by a preponderance of the evidence—a defendant's use is 
unreasonable. The Act, however, provides, "Surface water withdrawals made by 
permitted or registered surface water withdrawers shall be presumed to be 
reasonable." § 49-4-110(B). The Act is unclear whether the presumption is 
rebuttable or conclusive.12  Employing the rules of statutory construction, we find 
the presumption is rebuttable.13  Therefore, under the Act, a plaintiff may still meet 
12 A rebuttable presumption is defined as an "inference drawn from certain facts 
that establish a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of 
contrary evidence." Rebuttable Presumption, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). A conclusive presumption is defined as a "presumption that cannot be 
overcome by any additional evidence or argument because it is accepted as 
irrefutable proof that establishes a fact beyond dispute."  Conclusive Presumption, 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
13 The presumption of reasonableness is found in the first sentence of subsection 
49-4-110(B). The next sentence specifically contemplates a right of action for 
damages, "No private cause of action for damages . . . from a surface water 
withdrawal . . . may be maintained unless the plaintiff can show a violation of a 
valid permit or registration." § 49-4-110(B) (emphasis added).  If we interpreted 
the presumption in the first sentence as conclusive, it would prevent any right of 
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his burden by proving—by a preponderance of the evidence—the defendant's use 
is unreasonable. 
In summary, the plaintiffs' allegations that the Act has deprived them of their 
common law riparian rights are not supported by the terms of the Act.  The 
plaintiffs may still challenge an agricultural use as unreasonable, they are still 
entitled to injunctive relief when they prove the required elements, and they may 
still recover damages when they satisfy the applicable standard of proof.  Because 
the Act has not deprived the plaintiffs of their riparian rights, they have no 
standing, and their claim for future injury is not ripe for our determination.   
The plaintiffs also argue they have standing under the public importance exception.  
"[S]tanding is not inflexible and standing may be conferred upon a party when an 
issue is of such public importance as to require its resolution for future guidance."
ATC S., Inc. v. Charleston Cty., 380 S.C. 191, 198, 669 S.E.2d 337, 341 (2008).  
However, we "must be cautious with this exception, lest it swallow the rule."  S.C. 
Pub. Interest Found. v. S.C. Transp. Infrastructure Bank, 403 S.C. 640, 646, 744 
S.E.2d 521, 524 (2013). We find the public importance exception does not apply 
in this case because there is no need for "future guidance."   
B. The Public Trust Claim 
The plaintiffs argue the Act violates the public trust doctrine because its provisions 
"effectively dispose of substantial, permanent rights in South Carolina's navigable 
waterways to agricultural users."  They allege the state has "lost complete control 
of registered amounts of water in perpetuity" and the "registered owner has 
complete control over whether or not the state can ever alter the registered 
amount."   
action for damages, and thus the first sentence would be in conflict with the second 
sentence. "[S]tatutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the 
same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect, if 
it can be done by any reasonable construction."  Hudson ex rel. Hudson v. 
Lancaster Convalescent Ctr., 407 S.C. 112, 124–25, 754 S.E.2d 486, 492–93 
(2014). "It is the duty of this Court to give all parts and provisions of a legislative 
enactment effect and reconcile conflicts if reasonably and logically possible."  
Adams v. Clarendon Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 270 S.C. 266, 272, 241 S.E.2d 897, 900 
(1978). Reading the presumption as rebuttable leaves no conflict. 
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We begin our discussion of the public trust claim by observing that, to resolve this 
appeal, it is not necessary that we determine whether the public trust doctrine even 
applies in this case. South Carolina has recognized the public trust doctrine for at 
least 132 years, see Pac. Guano Co., 22 S.C. at 83-84, yet all of the appellate court 
decisions we have found applying the doctrine indicate it protects the waterway 
itself and the land below the high water mark. See, e.g., Kiawah Dev. Partners, II 
v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 411 S.C. 16, 29, 766 S.E.2d 707, 715 
(2014) (stating public trust doctrine applies to "lands below the high water line"); 
Wilson, 391 S.C. at 572, 707 S.E.2d at 406 (stating the "State holds presumptive 
title to all land below the high water mark"); Sierra Club, 318 S.C. at 128, 456 
S.E.2d at 402 (stating the issue before the Court was "whether the docks 
substantially impair the public interest in the public trust lands and waters" and 
finding no violation of the public trust doctrine because "the docks would not 
substantially impair marine life, water quality, or public access to the area");14 Pac. 
Guano Co., 22 S.C. at 87 (finding "the defendants mined in the beds of [navigable] 
streams running through their lands under an honest but mistaken belief of their 
right to do so"); Grant v. State, 395 S.C. 225, 229, 717 S.E.2d 96, 98 (Ct. App. 
2011) ("Title to land between the high and low water marks remains in the State 
and is held in trust for the benefit of the public.").  We have never held the public 
trust doctrine prohibits the State from allowing riparian landowners to use the 
water in the waterway. 
Nevertheless, the non-justiciability of the claim that the Surface Water Withdrawal 
Act violates the public trust doctrine is apparent on the face of the Act itself.  The
basic premise of the doctrine is the State does not have the power to convey to 
private owners assets the State holds in trust for its people. The Supreme Court of 
the United States explained this in Illinois Central Railroad Company: 
A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a 
state has never been adjudged to be within the legislative 
power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be 
held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to 
14 In Sierra Club, to explain the general nature of the public trust doctrine, we 
quoted an expansive statement from an article in the Tulane Environmental Law 
Journal as to the scope of the doctrine.  318 S.C. at 127-28, 456 S.E.2d at 402.  
However, the permit applicant in that case never intended to consume the water 
itself, and we therefore confined our actual ruling to the permit's impact on the 
waterway: "marine life, water quality, or public access."  318 S.C. at 128, 456 
S.E.2d at 402.
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revocation. The state can no more abdicate its trust over 
property in which the whole people are interested, like 
navigable waters and soils under them . . . than it can 
abdicate its police powers . . . . 
146 U.S. at 453, 13 S. Ct. at 118, 36 L. Ed. at 1043. 
The State does have the power, however, to take legislative action "promoting the 
interests of the public."  Id.; see also Pac. Guano Co., 22 S.C. at 84 (stating "the 
state as such trustee has the power to dispose of these beds as she may think best 
for her citizens"). The issue in Illinois Central Railroad Company was "whether 
the railroad corporation can hold the lands and control the waters by the grant, 
against any future exercise of power over them by the State."  146 U.S. at 452, 13 
S. Ct. at 118, 36 L. Ed. at 1042.  Explaining the applicability of the public trust 
doctrine to that question, the Supreme Court differentiated between grants by the 
state that improve the interests of the people and grants that interfere with those 
interests: 
The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters 
and in commerce over them may be improved in many 
instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and piers 
therein, for which purpose the state may grant parcels of 
the submerged lands; and, so long as their disposition is 
made for such purpose, no valid objections can be made 
to the grants. It is grants of parcels of lands under 
navigable waters that may afford foundation for wharves, 
piers, docks, and other structures in aid of commerce, and 
grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not 
substantially impair the public interest in the lands and 
waters remaining, that are chiefly considered and 
sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise of 
legislative power consistently with the trust to the public 
upon which such lands are held by the state.  But that is a 
very different doctrine from the one which would 
sanction the abdication of the general control of the state 
over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor 
or bay, or of a sea or lake.  Such abdication is not 
consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires 
the government of the state to preserve such waters for 
the use of the public. 
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146 U.S. at 452-53, 13 S. Ct. at 118, 36 L. Ed. at 1042. 
By its terms, the Surface Water Withdrawal Act is designed to allow use of surface 
waters to promote the interests of the people, while protecting against any use of 
surface water that is contrary to those interests.  First, the Act allows DHEC to 
grant a permit only if it "determines that the applicant's proposed use is 
reasonable," § 49-4-25, and requires DHEC, before allowing registration, to make 
a "determination as to whether [the anticipated withdrawal] quantity is within the 
safe yield for that water source," § 49-4-35(C).  Second, the Act grants DHEC the
power to subsequently restrict permitted and registered surface water usage when 
necessary to protect the public interest.  Under subsection 49-4-120(A), DHEC 
"may modify, suspend, or revoke a permit under [listed] conditions."  Similarly, 
subsection 49-4-35(E) enables DHEC to "modify the amount an existing registered 
surface water withdrawer may withdraw, or suspend or revoke a registered surface 
water withdrawer's authority to withdraw water."15 
The plaintiffs' public trust doctrine claims are based exclusively on their belief that 
future surface water withdrawals may endanger assets held in trust by the State, 
and their argument that the Surface Water Withdrawal Act prohibits the State from 
protecting those assets. As we have explained, however, the Act provides several 
mechanisms for DHEC to protect against the loss of trust assets.  On its face, 
therefore, the Act is entirely consistent with the State's obligations under the public 
trust doctrine. Until a plaintiff alleges the State is failing to utilize its power under 
the Act or otherwise failing to protect public trust assets, any claim based on the 
public trust doctrine does not present a justiciable controversy. 
In Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431, 434, 593 S.E.2d 470, 472 (2004), we explained 
that the decision of whether to utilize the public importance exception to standing 
requires balancing two competing interests: 
15 In addition, the Drought Response Act protects the State's interest in the water in 
navigable streams.  S.C. Code Ann. §§ 49-23-10 to -100 (2008 & Supp. 2016).  
Under the Drought Response Act, the Department of Natural Resources has the 
duty to "formulate, coordinate, and execute a drought mitigation plan," § 49-23-30, 
and has broad powers to protect the water in navigable streams against excessive 
consumption by surface water withdrawers, e.g., § 49-23-50. These powers 
include the authority to prevent most registered agricultural users from
withdrawing unreasonable amounts of water during periods of drought.  § 49-23-
70(C). 
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An appropriate balance between the competing policy 
concerns underlying the issue of standing must be 
realized. Citizens must be afforded access to the judicial 
process to address alleged injustices.  On the other hand, 
standing cannot be granted to every individual who has a 
grievance against a public official.  Otherwise, public 
officials would be subject to numerous lawsuits at the 
expense of both judicial economy and the freedom from 
frivolous lawsuits. 
 
357 S.C. at 434, 593 S.E.2d at 472.    
 
The "alleged injustice" the plaintiffs seek to address in this case is that at some 
point in the future the State may fail to protect against currently nonexistent 
unreasonable uses of surface water, which in turn could become so severe that the 
State's inaction amounts to a violation of its responsibilities to protect the public 
trust. However, neither the plaintiffs nor this Court can predict whether the State 
will attempt the necessary future action to protect against these hypothetical future 
unreasonable uses, and thus the "Citizens must be afforded access to the judicial 
process" side of the Sloan balance carries very little weight. After weighing that 
factor against the other competing interests we described in Sloan, we find the 
public importance exception should not apply to the plaintiffs' public trust 
claim.  As we have stated before, courts "must be cautious with this exception, lest 
it swallow the rule." S.C. Pub. Interest Found., 403 S.C. at 646, 744 S.E.2d at 524.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
We find the plaintiffs do not have standing and have not made any claim that is 
ripe for judicial determination.  Therefore, the circuit court correctly determined 
there is no justiciable controversy.  Accordingly, the circuit court's decision to 
grant summary judgment in favor of DHEC is AFFIRMED. 
 
Acting Justices Costa M. Pleicones and James E. Moore, concur. HEARN, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part in a separate opinion in which 
BEATTY, C.J., concurs. 
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JUSTICE HEARN: I concur with the majority's analysis of Appellants' takings 
and due process claims, but I respectfully dissent on the issue of the public trust 
doctrine. Because of the Surface Water Withdrawal Act's inherent connection to the
public waterways of South Carolina, I would find that Appellants' public trust claim 
comes within the public importance exception to standing. Cognizant of the fact
that the public importance exception is used sparingly by this Court, I believe if there 
is ever a time when the doctrine should be applied, this is it.
DISCUSSION 
I. STANDING
The public importance exception provides standing to a plaintiff where an
issue is of such public importance that its resolution is required for future guidance.  
Sloan v. Dep't of Transp., 365 S.C. 299, 304, 618 S.E.2d 876, 878 (2005). Thus, the 
doctrine affords citizens access to the judicial process to address alleged injustices 
where standing otherwise would not be available. See Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 
431, 434, 593 S.E.2d 470, 472 (2004). We have applied the doctrine in a wide range 
of cases where we determined an underlying societal interest required resolution.
See, e.g., S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. S.C. Transp. Infrastructure Bank, 403 S.C. 
640, 645, 744 S.E.2d 521, 524 (2013) (issue of whether statute governing 
composition of board of directors of state infrastructure bank was unconstitutional 
fell within public interest exception); Davis v. Richland County Council, 372 S.C. 
497, 500, 642 S.E.2d 740, 742 (2007) (finding public importance standing to bring 
action challenging constitutionality of act altering method for electing members of 
county commission); Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 531, 511 S.E.2d 69, 
75 (1999) (doctors had standing to seek injunction against county issuing tax exempt
bonds for purchase of medical facility).  
The circuit judge based his decision to deny public importance standing to 
Appellants in part on the lack of previous challenges to the Act.  This was error.  A
history of previous challenges to legislation is not a prerequisite to achieving
standing under the public importance exception; if indeed it were, no party could 
ever raise a novel issue without meeting traditional standing requirements, and the 
public importance exception would be rendered meaningless. Rather, the touchstone 
of the doctrine is whether the matter is "inextricably connected to the public need 
for court resolution for future guidance." ATC South, Inc. v. Charleston County, 380 
S.C. 191, 199, 669 S.E.2d 337, 341 (2008). Given Appellants' allegations regarding 
violations of the public trust, I believe the claim implicates significant societal
interests deserving of a definitive disposition. 
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Accordingly, I would reverse the circuit judge's grant of summary judgment 
as to the public trust claim. Rather than address the merits of Appellants' claim at
this stage without the benefit of a fully developed record, I would simply reverse 
summary judgment and remand to the circuit court. However, because the majority 
has expressed its views on the merits of Appellants' claim, I feel compelled to do so 
as well. 
II. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine protects the public's "inalienable right to breathe 
clean air; to drink safe water; to fish and sail, and recreate upon the high seas, 
territorial seas and navigable waters; as well as to land on the seashores and 
riverbanks." Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Associates, 318 S.C. 119, 127–28, 456 
S.E.2d 397, 402 (1995). With this in mind, I turn to the particular aspects of the Act
which I believe impede the State's ability to manage the public trust.   
Section 49-4-35(E) of the Act grants DHEC authority only to modify a 
registered user's withdrawal if the amount of water being withdrawn is "substantially 
more" than his registered amount and the withdrawals have detrimental effects on 
the environment or human health. S.C. Code Ann. § 49-4-35(E) (Supp. 2016).  
Whereas under the common law the right to withdraw was correlative, and 
reasonableness was ever dependent upon the dynamic conditions of the waterway, 
the Act now allows a registered user to lock in a presumed reasonable volume of 
withdrawable water in perpetuity. Problematically, section 49-4-35(E) grants 
DHEC no authority to modify withdrawals unless the user exceeds his registered 
amount. In other words, the Act has established fixed withdrawals which do not 
fluctuate according to in-stream conditions. While withdrawing four million gallons 
per month may have no harmful effects at the present, changing conditions in ten 
years may render that amount detrimental to a waterway. Under this new regulatory 
scheme, a user may continue to withdraw the registered amount even if it is harmful 
to the health of the waterway, and DHEC has no authority to curtail those 
withdrawals so long as the user remains within his registered amount. The common 
law system which once allowed for flexibility has been replaced by a more rigid
framework that does not on its face provide sufficient authority for DHEC to protect
the public's interest in South Carolina's waterways. Though I believe a water  
permitting regime can be implemented without jeopardizing the public trust, I find 
the Act flawed in that it does not grant DHEC the inherent authority to modify a
registered user's withdrawals as conditions may require.   
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The majority cites to the Drought Response Act to further support its position 
that the State has not abrogated its duties to protect and manage public waterways.  
Specifically, the majority suggests that section 49-23-70(C) of the South Carolina 
Code (Supp. 2016) grants the State authority to limit withdrawals made by registered
users in times of drought. I will not delve into a lengthy analysis of the statute 
because it is not at issue in this case; however, a plain reading of this subsection 
indicates that it grants the State authority to curtail only nonessential uses, carving 
out exceptions for essential uses, including agricultural operations for food 
production––precisely one of the industries that would qualify as a registered user 
under the Act. In short, neither the Act nor the Drought Response Act creates any 
mechanism for the State to lower the registered amount if it becomes harmful to the 
waterway unless the user exceeds his registered amount.
By crafting the Act in such a way that DHEC is limited in its ability to modify 
registered withdrawals, I believe the State has compromised its  duty to prevent 
"activity that substantially impairs the public interest in marine life, water quality, 
or public access." McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 354 S.C. 142, 149, 580 S.E.2d 
116, 119-20 (2003). Therefore, I do not join the majority in holding the Act is 
entirely consistent with the State's obligations under the public trust doctrine.    
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, I believe the circuit judge erred in granting 
summary judgment on Appellants' public trust doctrine claim, and I would reverse 
and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
BEATTY, C.J., concurs. 
46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from Spartanburg County 
J. Mark Hayes II, Trial Judge 
J. Derham Cole, Post-Conviction Relief Judge 
 
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
In The Supreme Court
  
Farid A. Mangal, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
State of South Carolina, Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-000610 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
Opinion No. 27726
 
Heard December 14, 2016 – Filed July 19, 2017
 
REVERSED
Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney
General Alicia A. Olive, both of Columbia, for
Petitioner.
John R. Ferguson, of Cox Ferguson & Wham, LLC, of 
Laurens, and C. Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for 
Respondent.
Solicitor J. Strom Thurmond, Solicitor Barry J. Barnette
and Amie Clifford, all of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae
Solicitors' Association of South Carolina, Inc.
Suzanne B. Cole, of Spartanburg and Candice A. Lively,
of Chester, for Amicus Curiae South Carolina Network 
47
 
 
 
   
 
 
     
 
  
    
    
   
  
       
 
 
  
 
   
      
 
      
  
    
 
          
 
    
  
 
  
    
   
      
      
 
                                                 
    
  
 
of Children's Advocacy Centers and University of South 
Carolina Children Law Center.
JUSTICE FEW: Farid A. Mangal was convicted of criminal sexual conduct with 
a minor, lewd act upon a child, and incest. After his convictions were affirmed,
Mangal filed this action for post-conviction relief (PCR).  He argues trial counsel 
was ineffective for not objecting to improper bolstering testimony.  The PCR court
refused to rule on the improper bolstering issue because the court found Mangal 
did not raise it in his PCR application or at the PCR hearing. The court of appeals 
reversed, finding the improper bolstering issue was raised to the PCR court.  The
court of appeals then proceeded to grant PCR on the merits of the issue before it 
was considered by the PCR court. We reverse the court of appeals and reinstate
the PCR court's order.  
I. Facts and Procedural History
The facts surrounding Mangal's sex crimes are set forth in detail in the court of
appeals' opinion. Mangal v. State, 415 S.C. 310, 781 S.E.2d 732 (Ct. App. 2015).
Focusing on those facts relevant to the specific issues in this appeal, the victim— 
Mangal's nineteen-year-old daughter—testified Mangal had been sexually
assaulting her since she was ten years old. She described where, when, and how it
happened.  On cross-examination, trial counsel questioned the victim about 
inconsistencies in her testimony and suggested she had a motive to lie about the
sexual abuse—to gain freedom from Mangal's strict parenting.  Mangal testified in 
his defense and claimed the victim and her mother fabricated the allegations.
Mangal's improper bolstering claim is based on the testimony of the State's witness 
Nancy Henderson, M.D., a pediatrician the trial court qualified as an expert "in the
examination, diagnosis, and treatment of child sex abuse."  Dr. Henderson testified 
she conducted a physical examination of the victim and discovered her "hymen 
tissue looked very, very normal" except for a "marked narrowing" at one spot.1 
Dr. Henderson concluded this was "a sign of some type of penetration."  She then
testified the victim had been "sexually abused," and that her opinion was "based on 
the history [the victim] shared with me and based on my examination." Trial 
counsel cross-examined Dr. Henderson in part by emphasizing her reliance on the
1 Dr. Henderson explained the hymen "is a type of flexible tissue in the adolescent 
population that partially covers the vaginal opening."
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victim's history—as opposed to the physical examination—in forming her opinion
that the hymen injury resulted from sexual abuse.
The jury convicted Mangal of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first
degree, criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree (two counts), 
lewd act upon a child,2 and incest. The trial court sentenced Mangal to thirty years
in prison, and the court of appeals affirmed his convictions. State v. Mangal, Op. 
No. 2009-UP-113 (S.C. Ct. App. filed March 4, 2009).
Mangal filed his PCR application without the assistance of counsel.3 As required 
by section 17-27-50 of the South Carolina Code (2014) and Rule 71.1(b) of the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, he made the application on the form
prescribed by this Court. See Form 5, SCRCP Appendix of Forms.  In the blank 
requiring the applicant to "State concisely the grounds on which you base your
allegation that you are being held in custody unlawfully," Mangal handwrote, (a) 
"ineffective assistance of counsel trial," (b) "prejudiceness," (c) "ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel." In the blank requiring the applicant to "State
concisely and in the same order the facts which support each of the grounds set out 
[above]," Mangal handwrote (a) "failure to preserve direct appeal issue," (b) "failed
to investigate documentary evidence and witnesses," and (c) "fail to make an 
additional object[ion] to the sufficiency of the curative charge or moved for a
mistrial." He also wrote "will amend pursuant to SCRCP, Rule 71.1" to include
"new grounds upon appt. of PCR counsel," in apparent recognition that Rule
71.1(d) requires, "Counsel shall insure that all available grounds for relief are
included in the application and shall amend the application if necessary."
Mangal was subsequently appointed counsel, but no written amendment to 
Mangal's original application was filed. Mangal's counsel began the PCR hearing
by calling witnesses, giving no indication to the PCR court he intended to raise any
2 This offense is now classified as criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the third 
degree under subsection 16-3-655(C) of the South Carolina Code (2015).
3 There is no provision of law for the appointment of counsel in a PCR proceeding 
unless the application raises questions of law or fact which the court determines 
require a hearing. See Rule 71.1(d), SCRCP ("If, after the State has filed its return,
the application presents questions of law or fact which will require a hearing, the
court shall promptly appoint counsel to assist the applicant if he is indigent."); see
also Whitehead v. State, 310 S.C. 532, 535, 426 S.E.2d 315, 316 (1992) ("Rule
71.1(d) mandates the appointment of counsel for indigent PCR applicants 
whenever a PCR hearing is held to determine questions of law or fact.").
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issues not set forth in the original application. During his presentation of evidence,
PCR counsel asked trial counsel why he did not object to "improper bolstering"
testimony given by Dr. Henderson, and the State briefly cross-examined him on 
the same subject. However, PCR counsel did not mention any intent to make an 
ineffective assistance claim based on a failure to object to improper bolstering
testimony until the end of the hearing.  At that point, he argued trial counsel was 
ineffective in several respects not mentioned in the original application, including
for not objecting to the alleged improper bolstering testimony of Dr. Henderson.
The PCR court denied relief in a written order without addressing the improper
bolstering issue. Mangal made a motion under Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend the judgment, arguing the PCR court
should have addressed the improper bolstering issue. The PCR court denied the
motion and held the improper bolstering issue was "not presented to the court in 
the application or in an amendment, and no testimonial evidence from the applicant 
was presented in support of these allegations."
Mangal filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the denial of PCR, 
which we transferred to the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 243(l) of the South 
Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  Mangal argued trial counsel was ineffective for
not objecting to Dr. Henderson's testimony and the PCR court erred by not ruling 
on the issue. The court of appeals agreed the PCR court erred in not ruling on the
improper bolstering issue. Mangal, 415 S.C. at 317-18, 781 S.E.2d at 735-36.  The
court of appeals then addressed the merits of the issue, finding Dr. Henderson's 
testimony was improper bolstering and counsel was ineffective for not objecting to 
it. 415 S.C. at 319-20, 781 S.E.2d at 736-37.  The court of appeals remanded to 
the court of general sessions for a new trial. 415 S.C. at 319-20, 781 S.E.2d at 737.  
The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari for review of the court of appeals'
decision, which we granted.
II. Standard of Review
Our standard of review in PCR cases depends on the specific issue before us.  We
defer to a PCR court's findings of fact and will uphold them if there is any
evidence in the record to support them. Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 
S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (citing Jordan v. State, 406 S.C. 443, 448, 752 S.E.2d 538,
540 (2013)). We do not defer to a PCR court's rulings on questions of law.4 
4  The court of appeals incorrectly stated "an appellate court 'gives great deference 
to the PCR court's . . . conclusions of law,'" quoting our own incorrect statement in 
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"Questions of law are reviewed de novo, and we will reverse the PCR court's 
decision when it is controlled by an error of law."  Sellner, 416 S.C. at 610, 787 
S.E.2d at 527 (citing Jamison v. State, 410 S.C. 456, 465, 765 S.E.2d 123, 127 
(2014)). On review of a PCR court's resolution of procedural questions arising 
under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act or the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Winkler v. State, 418 
S.C. 643, 663, 795 S.E.2d 686, 697 (2016) (applying an abuse of discretion 
standard to the trial court's decision on a motion for a continuance); Sweet v. State, 
255 S.C. 293, 296, 178 S.E.2d 657, 658 (1971) (same).
III. Presentation of the Improper Bolstering Issue
We first address the court of appeals' ruling that the improper bolstering issue was
presented to the PCR court, and thus the PCR court erred in not ruling on it. We
find the PCR court acted within its discretion in refusing to address the issue.  
First, the written application makes no mention of a claim based on improper
bolstering, and no amendment to the written application was ever made.  Second,
PCR counsel began the hearing without mentioning there would be any additional
claims for ineffective counsel beyond those listed in the original application.  
Third, even when PCR counsel questioned trial counsel on why he did not object to 
Dr. Henderson's testimony, he did not inform the PCR court he would make a
claim for ineffectiveness based on the failure to make an objection.
Fourth, when PCR counsel did finally mention an ineffectiveness claim based on 
the testimony of Dr. Henderson, he did not make the claim with specificity.  In 
what was essentially a closing argument, PCR counsel argued for relief on several 
unrelated grounds, and then stated,
We also brought up the issue of Dr. Henderson.  I believe
in this case we have no case law specifically on allowing 
an expert to say in her opinion abuse occurred.  She
wasn't asked that question.  She gave that answer. It did
not receive an objection which we believe it should have.
It was improper vouching.
Porter v. State, 368 S.C. 378, 383, 629 S.E.2d 353, 356 (2006).  Mangal, 415 S.C. 
at 316, 781 S.E.2d at 734.  We clarify that appellate courts review questions of law 
de novo, with no deference to trial courts. 
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There was no further discussion of any claim for ineffectiveness based on trial 
counsel not objecting to Dr. Henderson's testimony.
To the extent PCR counsel's brief statement constitutes a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, we find a PCR judge would have difficulty recognizing it.
The entire evidentiary presentation at the PCR hearing regarding trial counsel's
decision not to object to Dr. Henderson's testimony consisted of three points.  First,
the PCR court was informed that the State asked Dr. Henderson, "Do you have an 
opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty based on your education,
training, and experience, and based on your findings on examination of the victim,
whether those findings are consistent with a penetrating injury?" Second, PCR
counsel immediately commented, "Which was an appropriate question under our
law, I would think."  Third, the PCR court was informed Dr. Henderson stated she
"believed [the victim] had been abused." Thus, the only evidentiary basis PCR 
counsel presented to support the premise that Dr. Henderson's testimony was 
improper bolstering was the fact Dr. Henderson testified she believed the victim
had been abused.
In its opinion concluding Dr. Henderson's testimony was improper bolstering, the
court of appeals relied on several additional portions of Dr. Henderson's testimony
that were not revealed to the PCR court at any point during the PCR hearing.  First, 
the court of appeals relied on the fact Dr. Henderson testified she considered "the
history that [Victim] gave [her]" in reaching her opinion the victim had been 
abused. 415 S.C. at 319, 781 S.E.2d at 736. However, the PCR hearing transcript 
contains no mention of any such testimony.  Second, most of the testimony the
court of appeals relied on to support its conclusion Dr. Henderson's testimony was 
improper bolstering was actually elicited by trial counsel on cross-examination.
There was no reference to any of that testimony during the PCR hearing, and PCR 
counsel never directed the PCR court to the trial transcript.
Finally with regard to the PCR court's exercise of discretion in refusing to address 
the improper bolstering issue, Mangal filed a Rule 59(e) motion asking the PCR
court to consider the claim.  The PCR court denied the motion, finding "no 
testimonial evidence . . . was presented in support of these allegations."  We agree
with the PCR court. The most generous interpretation of the improper bolstering 
claim—as counsel described it to the PCR court in closing argument and in the
Rule 59(e) motion5—limits the claim to the failure to object to Dr. Henderson's 
5  Mangal's current PCR appellate counsel did not represent him at the PCR hearing 
or in filing the Rule 59(e) motion. 
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direct examination opinion testimony that the narrowing of the victim's hymen 
indicated a penetrating injury due to sexual abuse. Even if the PCR court had 
independently consulted the trial transcript of the direct examination of Dr.
Henderson, the court would have discovered no further support for the claim other
than Dr. Henderson considered the victim's history in reaching her opinion.
Notably, the PCR court would also have discovered Dr. Henderson did not repeat 
to the jury what the victim told her in that history.
From a procedural standpoint, the court of appeals relied on Simpson v. Moore, 
367 S.C. 587, 627 S.E.2d 701 (2006), which it found "similar" to this case, to
support its conclusion the PCR court erred by not ruling on the improper bolstering 
issue. Mangal, 415 S.C. at 317, 781 S.E.2d at 735.  Simpson is similar to this case
in that the PCR court refused to rule on a PCR claim "because Simpson did not 
specifically raise it in his PCR application." 367 S.C. at 599, 627 S.E.2d at 707.
Also similar to this case, Simpson filed a Rule 59(e) motion challenging the PCR
court's refusal to rule on the issue.  367 S.C. at 600 n.3, 627 S.E.2d at 708 n.3. We
held "Simpson should have been permitted to amend his PCR application to 
conform to the evidence presented."  367 S.C. at 599, 627 S.E.2d at 708.  
However, there are significant dissimilarities between Simpson and this case.  First,
Simpson was an appeal from a three and one-half day PCR hearing, and PCR 
counsel's intention to pursue the disputed issue was made clear during the PCR 
hearing. The issue concerned an alleged Brady6 violation involving a bag of
money, which trial counsel testified he learned of "two hours before testifying" at
the PCR trial,7 and the State knew about it in time to present a witness "whom the
State called for the specific purpose of addressing the . . . issue." 367 S.C. at 599,
627 S.E.2d at 707. The PCR court also left the record open in Simpson for the
State to submit additional evidence. 367 S.C. at 608, 627 S.E.2d at 712.  Here, on
the other hand, the State had no notice Mangal intended to pursue the claim until 
the end of the hearing, after all the evidence had been presented.  Though the State
6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
7 In Simpson, we stated, "Simpson's defense counsel . . . testified that he learned 
about the bag of money only two hours before testifying." 367 S.C. at 599, 627 
S.E.2d at 707.  We used the word "only" to emphasize the merit of the Brady
claim—that trial counsel was never informed of exculpatory information.  We did 
not mention it in relation to the late indication of an intent to pursue the PCR
claim.  The important fact here is that the applicant's intent to pursue the claim was 
clear during the PCR hearing.
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did conduct a brief cross-examination of trial counsel on his decision not to object 
to Dr. Henderson's testimony, the State had little reason to suspect her testimony
would form part of the basis of a PCR claim yet to be made.
Second, the PCR court in Simpson made a specific finding as to the merits of the
Brady claim, stating "the contents of the bag could have been exculpatory," and 
"this evidence should have been preserved and, thus, been subject to discovery."
367 S.C. at 599, 627 S.E.2d at 707. We observed, "Despite this finding, the [PCR]
court ruled that the issue about the bag of money was not preserved for review
because Simpson did not specifically raise it in his PCR application."  Id. Here,
the PCR court made no such finding on the merits of the improper bolstering issue.
Finally, we specifically relied in Simpson on Rule 15(b) of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure, under which—we stated—"pleadings may be amended,
even after judgment, to conform to issues tried by express or implied consent but 
not raised in the original pleadings."  367 S.C. at 599, 627 S.E.2d at 708 (citing 
Rule 15(b), SCRCP).  The focus of a Rule 15(b) analysis is prejudice to the
opposing party. See Harvey v. Strickland, 350 S.C. 303, 313, 566 S.E.2d 529, 535 
(2002) (holding Rule 15(b) "[a]mendments to conform to the proof should be
liberally allowed when no prejudice to the opposing party will result.").  We
analyzed prejudice in Simpson, holding "the State would not be prejudiced by such 
an amendment given that the State cross-examined Simpson's defense counsel on 
the issue and was permitted to present its own witness . . . to contest the issue's 
relevance."  Simpson, 367 S.C. at 599, 627 S.E.2d at 708. The court of appeals did 
not mention any prejudice analysis in this case before relying on Simpson to find 
error in the PCR court's refusal to allow an amendment.
IV. Excusing Procedural Default in PCR Proceedings
There have been rare cases in which we have excused PCR applicants from
procedural failures such as occurred in this case.  In Simmons v. State, 416 S.C. 
584, 788 S.E.2d 220 (2016), for example, the PCR applicant properly amended his 
application to assert "a claim that the State violated his due process rights by
presenting false evidence to the jury" with its presentation of DNA evidence.  416 
S.C. at 589, 788 S.E.2d at 223.  The PCR court granted relief on another issue, as a
result of which the applicant's death sentence was vacated. 416 S.C. at 586, 788 
S.E.2d at 222.  The PCR court "summarily denied the remaining claims, including 
Simmons's challenge to the DNA evidence, 'as without merit.'"  416 S.C. at 591,
788 S.E.2d at 224.  As to the summary denial of those claims, "Simmons failed to 
file a Rule 59, SCRCP motion, as our issue-preservation rules require." Id.; see
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Marlar v. State, 375 S.C. 407, 410, 653 S.E.2d 266, 267 (2007) (holding that when 
a PCR court fails to make specific findings as to an issue, a Rule 59(e) motion is 
necessary to preserve the issue for appeal).  We held that although the State was 
"technically correct" to argue Simmons' DNA claim was procedurally barred,
"dismissing the writ of certiorari would be fundamentally contrary to the interests 
of justice." Simmons, 416 S.C. at 591, 788 S.E.2d at 224.  We remanded the case
to the PCR court for a new trial on the DNA claim.  416 S.C. at 593-94, 788 S.E.2d
at 225.
Our ruling in Simmons was based on the State's presentation—though innocent—of 
false evidence underlying the State's analysis of DNA.  416 S.C. at 591, 788 S.E.2d 
at 224.  We relied on precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States and 
this Court to support the need for the "extraordinary action" we took under that 
circumstance to excuse the procedural bar.  416 S.C. at 591-92, 788 S.E.2d at 224 
(citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L. Ed. 2d
1217, 1221 (1959) and Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 47-48, 631 S.E.2d 70, 75 
(2006)).
In most PCR cases, however, we have refused to excuse the pleading and issue-
preservation requirements that apply in all civil cases.  In Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 
448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991), for example, we refused to relax procedural 
requirements simply "on the ground that his first . . . PCR application was
insufficient due to ineffective PCR counsel."  305 S.C. at 448, 409 S.E.2d at 393.
In Plyler v. State, 309 S.C. 408, 424 S.E.2d 477 (1992), the applicant attempted to
raise on appeal for the first time a burden-shifting claim based on trial counsel's 
failure to object to the trial court's malice charge.  309 S.C. at 409, 424 S.E.2d at 
478.  As to the merits of the claim, we found "the malice charge . . . is so diseased 
with burden-shifting presumptions that it violates Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979)." Plyler, 309 S.C. at 410-11, 424 
S.E.2d at 478.  Nevertheless, we affirmed the denial of PCR, stating, "Since this 
issue was neither raised at the PCR hearing nor ruled upon by the PCR court, it is 
procedurally barred."  309 S.C. at 409, 424 S.E.2d at 478.  In Marlar, we reversed
the court of appeals for addressing an issue not specifically addressed in a PCR
order when the applicant did not make a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rule
59(e).  375 S.C. at 410, 653 S.E.2d at 267.  We stated, "Because respondent did not 
make a Rule 59(e) motion . . . , the issues were not preserved for appellate review,
and the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the merits of the issues . . . ." Id.; see
also Humbert v. State, 345 S.C. 332, 337, 548 S.E.2d 862, 865 (2001) (stating the
failure to file a Rule 59(e) motion as to an issue not addressed by the PCR court 
leaves the issue unpreserved).
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We have often considered the tension between the rights at stake in PCR
proceedings and the application of traditional procedural requirements for the
presentation and preservation of issues. See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 418 S.C. 505, 
795 S.E.2d 29 (2016); Odom v. State, 337 S.C. 256, 523 S.E.2d 753 (1999).  The
Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed this tension in Martinez v.
Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012). The issue in 
Martinez was "whether a federal habeas court may excuse a procedural default of
an ineffective-assistance claim when the claim was not properly presented in state
court due to an attorney's errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding."  566 
U.S. at 5, 132 S. Ct. at 1313, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 280.  After Martinez was convicted 
in the state court of Arizona of two counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor,
the state appointed new counsel for the direct appeal.  566 U.S. at 5-6, 132 S. Ct. at 
1313-14, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 280.  While the direct appeal was pending, Martinez's 
newly-appointed counsel initiated a state PCR proceeding.  566 U.S. at 6, 132 S.
Ct. at 1314, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 280. However, counsel made no claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, and later filed a statement asserting there were "no 
colorable claims at all."  566 U.S. at 6, 132 S. Ct. at 1314, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 280-81.
The state court dismissed the PCR action.  566 U.S. at 6, 132 S. Ct. at 1314, 182 L.
Ed. 2d at 281.
Later, Martinez filed a second PCR action in state court with new counsel, this 
time asserting trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.  566 U.S. at 6-7, 132 S.
Ct. at 1314, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 281.  The state court dismissed this PCR action,
finding Martinez was procedurally barred from pursuing ineffective assistance
claims that should have been asserted in his first PCR action.  566 U.S. at 7, 132 S.
Ct. at 1314, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 281.  Martinez subsequently filed a writ of habeas 
corpus in federal court, again raising the ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Id. The district court refused to address the claims on the ground they were barred 
by procedural default in state court, and "Martinez had not shown cause to excuse
the procedural default."  566 U.S. at 7-8, 132 S. Ct. at 1315, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 281.
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  566 U.S. at 
8, 132 S. Ct. at 1315, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 282.
The Supreme Court held "a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court 
from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-
review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding 
was ineffective."  566 U.S. at 17, 132 S. Ct. at 1320, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 288.  In 
doing so, the Court recognized the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel 
is a "bedrock principle in our justice system," and acknowledged applicants 
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"confined to prison" and "unlearned in the law" often have difficulty complying 
with procedural rules in a PCR case.  566 U.S. at 12, 132 S. Ct. at 1317, 182 L. Ed.
2d at 284.  The Court then stated,
Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel when an attorney's 
errors (or the absence of an attorney) caused a procedural 
default in an initial-review collateral proceeding 
acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that the initial-
review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without 
counsel or with ineffective counsel, may not have been 
sufficient to ensure that proper consideration was given 
to a substantial claim.
566 U.S. at 14, 132 S. Ct. at 1318, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 285-86.
We first considered Martinez in Kelly v. State, 404 S.C. 365, 745 S.E.2d 377 
(2013).  We held Martinez "is limited to federal habeas corpus review and is not 
applicable to state post-conviction relief actions." 404 S.C. at 365, 745 S.E.2d at 
377.  We considered Martinez again in Robertson.  Reaffirming Kelly, we held 
"Martinez does not afford Petitioner a right to file a successive PCR application by
merely alleging ineffective assistance of prior PCR counsel." 418 S.C. at 516, 795 
S.E.2d at 34.  In Robertson, however, we permitted the PCR applicant to pursue a
successive application the PCR court found was procedurally barred. 418 S.C. at 
516, 795 S.E.2d at 34.
The Supreme Court's decision in Martinez reminds us that the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is a "bedrock principle in our justice
system." Simmons and Martinez counsel us that there are situations where the
interests of justice require PCR courts to be flexible with procedural requirements 
before PCR applicants suffer procedural default on substantial claims. Such 
flexibility is consistent with the purpose and spirit of our Rules of Civil 
Procedure.8 These considerations should guide PCR courts when struggling to 
8 See 4 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1029 (4th ed. 2015) ("The federal rules are designed to 
discourage battles over mere form and to sweep away needless procedural 
controversies that either delay a trial on the merits or deny a party his day in court 
because of technical deficiencies."); Maybank v. BB&T Corp., 416 S.C. 541, 565,
787 S.E.2d 498, 510 (2016) ("In construing the South Carolina Rules of Civil 
57
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
    
 
    
    
   
     
    
      
 
     
 
    
  
  
 
 
     
   
 
  
                                                 
   
   
 
balance procedural requirements against the importance of the issues at stake in 
PCR proceedings.  We encourage trial courts in PCR cases to use the discretion we
grant them on procedural matters to find reasonable ways—within the flexibility of
our Rules—to reach the merits of substantial issues.
As we stated in Odom and repeated in Robertson,
"All applicants are entitled to a full and fair opportunity
to present claims in one PCR application."
Robertson, 418 S.C. at 513, 795 S.E.2d at 33; Odom, 337 S.C. at 261, 523 S.E.2d 
at 755.
V. The Procedural Default in This Case
This is not an appropriate case in which to excuse Mangal from his procedural 
default. As we explained, the PCR court acted within its discretion to refuse to 
address any claim based on Dr. Henderson's direct examination testimony. In
addition to that testimony, however, the court of appeals relied on Dr. Henderson's
cross-examination testimony to support its conclusion of improper bolstering.  This
testimony does not convince us to excuse the procedural default.
First, none of it was presented to the PCR court at the hearing.  In addition, the
State makes a convincing argument that trial counsel elicited this testimony
intentionally pursuant to a valid trial strategy. See Watson v. State, 370 S.C. 68, 
72-73, 634 S.E.2d 642, 644 (2006) (finding counsel's performance was not 
deficient in making the decision not to object to "inadmissible" testimony because
his strategy—that doing so "might lead to the more damaging introduction" of
other evidence—was valid).
Trial counsel testified this was "not the first time I've been with Dr. Henderson."
When asked if he expected Dr. Henderson to give an opinion on whether the victim
had been sexually abused, trial counsel answered, "Not only did I expect it, but if
she had answered any other way I would have been shocked, because Dr.
Procedure, our Court looks for guidance to cases interpreting the federal rules."); 3 
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure § 8.2 (3d ed., rev. 2017) ("The spirit of the Rules
is to settle controversies upon their merits rather than to dismiss actions on 
technical grounds, to permit amendments liberally, and to avoid, if possible,
depriving a litigant of a chance to bring a case to trial.").  
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Henderson's testimony is canned testimony.  And she'll testify the same way in 
every trial." The State argues trial counsel, knowing Dr. Henderson would give an 
opinion the victim had been sexually abused, attempted to undermine her opinion 
by demonstrating to the jury that Dr. Henderson's opinion was not based on the
objective results of her physical examination, but rather on the victim's fabricated 
statements.  The State argues trial counsel then intentionally invited Dr. Henderson 
to admit she based her opinion on the truth of what the victim told her.  According
to the State, this allowed trial counsel to impeach Dr. Henderson's opinion with the
weaknesses he had previously shown in the victim's credibility. Otherwise, the
State argues, trial counsel was left with an expert opinion based only on objective
physical findings—a far more difficult opinion to impeach. We need not decide
whether this was a valid trial strategy.9 We simply find this evidence does not
support the extraordinary action of excusing Mangal's procedural default.
VI. Conclusion
We REVERSE the court of appeals' finding that the PCR court erred in refusing to 
address the improper bolstering issue, and REINSTATE the PCR court's order
denying PCR.  
KITTREDGE, J., concurs. BEATTY, C.J., HEARN, J., and Acting Justice 
Costa M. Pleicones concur in result only.
9 If we were to excuse the procedural default for failing to present this claim to the
PCR court, it would be necessary to remand to the PCR court for a hearing because
the PCR court was not given the opportunity to make factual findings as to the
reasonableness of this strategy, and if found not to be a reasonable strategy,
whether the applicant suffered prejudice.  See Simmons, 416 S.C. at 593, 788 
S.E.2d at 225 ("We sit today in an appellate capacity and making findings of fact 
de novo would be contrary to this appellate setting.").  
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Respondents/Petitioners. 

JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  We accepted this declaratory judgment matter in our 
original jurisdiction to determine if Respondents/Petitioners Quicken Loans, Inc. 
(Quicken Loans) and Title Source, Inc. (Title Source) have engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law (UPL).1  In their complaint, Petitioners/Respondents 
Vance L. and Thelma Boone, Travis G. and Theresa S. Messex, and Brian and 
Kelli Johnson (collectively "Homeowners"), alleged the residential mortgage 
refinancing model implemented by Quicken Loans and Title Source in refinancing 
the Homeowners' mortgage loans constitutes UPL.  In addition to seeking 
declaratory relief, Homeowners' complaint also sought class certification and 
requested class relief.2 
We referred this matter to a Special Referee to take evidence and issue a report 
containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations to the Court regarding 
the UPL issue, as well as on the issues of class certification and class relief.  
Following an evidentiary proceeding during which the parties submitted extensive 
testimony and documentary evidence, the Special Referee issued a report 
proposing various factual findings and recommending this Court declare that 
Quicken Loans and Title Source engaged in UPL but opining that neither class 
certification nor class relief were appropriate under the circumstances.  Quicken 
Loans and Title Source took exception to the Special Referee's proposed findings 
of fact and UPL recommendation.  Homeowners took exception to Special 
Referee's recommendation that class certification and class relief were unwarranted 
under the circumstances. 
1 In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by the South Carolina Bar, 
309 S.C. 304, 422 S.E.2d 123 (1992). 
2 Specifically, Homeowners requested that certain class members' mortgage liens 
filed after August 8, 2011, (the date this Court refiled its decision in Matrix 
Financial Services Corp. v. Frazer, 394 S.C. 134, 714 S.E.2d 532 (2011)), be 
declared void and that Quicken and Title Source be required to disgorge all fees 
collected during the refinancing process, together with prejudgment interest. 
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We find the record in this case shows licensed South Carolina attorneys were 
involved at every critical step of these refinancing transactions, as required by our 
precedents.  We also find that requiring more attorney involvement would not 
effectively further our stated goal of protecting the public from the dangers of 
UPL. We therefore respectfully reject the Special Referee's conclusion that 
Quicken Loans and Title Source committed UPL.  Because we reject the finding of 
UPL, we need not address the parties' remaining exceptions, including 
Homeowners' request that we declare their mortgages void and certify this case as 
a class action. 
I. 
Quicken Loans is a nationwide online mortgage lender that provides, among other 
things, residential mortgage loan refinances.  Prior to expanding into the South 
Carolina market, Quicken Loans engaged South Carolina attorneys—with 
expertise in real estate transactions and knowledgeable of our UPL 
jurisprudence—to review the Quicken Loans refinance procedure. After reviewing 
the procedure, the attorneys opined that the procedure would not constitute UPL, 
as evidenced by the sufficient involvement of a South Carolina lawyer at each 
critical step. Buoyed by the supporting opinions of South Carolina lawyers, 
Quicken Loans moved forward with offering residential mortgage loan refinance 
services to South Carolina borrowers. 
Under the Quicken Loans refinance procedure, the borrowers have already 
purchased the property and are simply seeking a new mortgage loan (presumably 
with more favorable terms) to replace the existing loan.  The process begins with a 
potential borrower completing a loan application, which is typically done online.  
Thereafter, the borrower speaks on the telephone with a licensed mortgage banker 
employed by Quicken Loans.  Each borrower is informed that he or she has the 
right to select legal counsel to represent him or her in the transaction and asked 
whether he or she has a preference as to a specific attorney.3  If the borrower does 
not desire to use a particular attorney during the loan transaction, Quicken Loans 
engages Title Source, a nationwide provider of settlement services and title 
3 See S.C. Code Ann. § 37-10-102 (2015) (requiring mortgage lenders to ascertain 
a borrower's preference as to the legal counsel they wish to employ to represent 
them in connection with closing the loan transaction).
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insurance, to provide the necessary settlement services.  Title Source, in turn, 
subcontracts with various individuals and entities (including licensed South 
Carolina attorneys) to perform those various services in compliance with South 
Carolina law.   
For the transactions at issue in this case, Title Source turned to a non-attorney 
abstractor (Abstractor) to perform a title search and prepare a title abstract.  In each 
of these transactions, Title Source initiated the title search by ordering a title 
abstract from Abstractor via email for each particular parcel of property to be 
refinanced. The scope of each title search was directed by Title Source in the 
email ordering the search; for loan refinances, no transfer of ownership takes place, 
so the title search includes two years back from the relevant vesting deed.  Upon 
receiving a title abstract order from Title Source, Abstractor determined the county 
in which the property is located, then traveled to the relevant county land records 
office to locate and photocopy the pertinent documents on record, such as deeds, 
mortgages, mortgage assignments, loan modifications, tax documents, and 
personal judgments against the borrower(s).  Thereafter, Abstractor prepared an 
"abstract" or index of the documents pulled from the public records, scanned and 
uploaded the abstract sheet along with the documents themselves, and 
electronically transmitted both the abstract and supporting documents back to Title 
Source through a web portal.4 
After Abstractor's reports were transmitted to Title Source through the web portal, 
Title Source subsequently digitally transmitted those reports to David Aylor, a 
South Carolina attorney, who personally reviewed the title abstract and 
accompanying documents.  If appropriate, based on his review of the documents, 
Aylor used an electronic template to generate and digitally sign title review 
certificates, verifying that he had reviewed the title documents and that the 
property owners held fee simple title to the property they were seeking to 
refinance.5  Following receipt of the title certification, Title Source produced a title 
4 Abstractor testified that occasionally, she would receive follow-up inquiries 
seeking clarification or requests for additional documents, and in those cases, she 
would revisit the county courthouse to clarify or to obtain the requested 
document(s) and upload those through the Title Source web portal.   
5 Aylor testified that in reviewing the documents in title abstracts, he would 
sometimes encounter a problem which required him to contact the abstractor with 
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commitment, which it submitted to Quicken Loans.   
Thereafter, Title Source and Quicken Loans coordinated to schedule the loan 
closings and prepare the closing package, including the HUD-1 settlement 
statement, note, mortgage, and closing instructions, which were reviewed by the 
closing attorney prior to closing.  In reviewing the closing package documents, the 
closing attorney confirmed that the title work was certified by a South Carolina 
lawyer and that the closing documents were accurate and complied with the law, 
and if necessary, made corrections or refused to proceed with the closing until the 
discrepancies were resolved. 
Thereafter, the closing attorneys met with the borrowers in person, explained the 
legal effect of the loan documents, answered any questions the borrowers had, and 
supervised the borrowers' execution of the legal instruments.  
Once the closing was finished, the attorney returned the executed documents to 
Title Source, along with detailed instructions on recording certain documents and 
disbursing loan proceeds. Upon the disbursement of funds, Title Source provided 
each closing attorney with a closing ledger, which the closing attorney used to 
confirm that disbursement of the funds was done in accordance with the HUD-1 
settlement statement.  Following recordation in the proper county land records 
office, a certified copy of each recorded document is mailed to the closing lawyer 
for their review. 
follow-up questions and occasionally, when the issue could not be resolved 
quickly, required him to notify Title Source that there would be a delay in issuing 
the title certificate. Aylor explained that sometimes the issue was as simple as 
poor copy quality of a particular document, but other times, it was "more serious 
than that." Aylor understood as the South Carolina attorney rendering an opinion 
as to the title of the property, he was responsible for reviewing the abstractor's
report and vouching for its legal sufficiency. See Ex parte Watson, 356 S.C. 432, 
436, 589 S.E.2d 760, 762 (2003) ("[W]e hold that when nonlawyer title abstractors 
examine public records and then render an opinion as to the content of those 
records, they are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. But if a licensed 
attorney reviews the title abstractor's report and vouches for its legal sufficiency by 
signing the report, title abstractors would not be engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law."). 
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Notably, each of the attorneys involved throughout these challenged transactions 
testified that they maintained their independence and were not controlled by 
Quicken Loans or Title Source in the exercise of their professional judgments.  
Moreover, at the hearing before the Special Referee, William Higgins, an expert in 
ethical and professional responsibility issues associated with real estate 
transactions in South Carolina, opined that Quicken Loans and Title Source had 
developed an "efficient, automated, consumer-friendly method" and "they've done 
so in a way that includes direct and appropriate involvement of South Carolina 
licensed lawyers, and they've done it in a way that [] allows those lawyers to act 
independently that does not impinge on their professional responsibilities or their 
professional independence." 
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Special Referee 
issued a report recommending this Court declare Respondents' conduct to be UPL 
and issue an injunction against Respondents conducting real estate refinance 
transactions in South Carolina.  In so finding, the Special Referee focused on the 
proper issue, that is, whether the supervision by the South Carolina attorneys was 
sufficient and "meaningful."        
Quicken Loans and Title Source take exception to the Special Referee's 
recommendation that the Court find they engaged in UPL and contend the Report 
and Recommendation misconstrued this Court's UPL precedents and omitted and 
ignored material facts demonstrating Respondents' compliance with the law and 
protection of South Carolina consumers.  Conversely, the Homeowners urge this 
Court to adopt the Special Referee's finding that Quicken Loans and Title Source 
engaged in UPL; the Homeowners further contend they are also entitled to 
additional relief beyond the injunction recommended by the Special Referee.   
II. 
The South Carolina Constitution assigns to this Court the duty to regulate the 
practice of law. S.C. Const. art. V, § 4.  "South Carolina, like other jurisdictions, 
limits the practice of law to licensed attorneys."  Brown v. Coe, 365 S.C. 137, 139, 
616 S.E.2d 705, 706 (2005) (citation omitted).  "[T]he policy of prohibiting laymen 
from practicing law is not for the purpose of creating a monopoly in the legal 
profession, nor for its protection, but to assure the public adequate protection in the 
pursuit of justice, by preventing the intrusion of incompetent and unlearned 
persons in the practice of law."  State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 5 
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S.E.2d 181, 186 (1939) (emphasis added). 
"The generally understood definition of the practice of law embraces the 
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special 
proceedings, and the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of 
clients before judges and courts." Crawford v. Cent. Mortg. Co., 404 S.C. 39, 45, 
744 S.E.2d 538, 541 (2013) (quoting State v. Despain, 319 S.C. 317, 319, 460 
S.E.2d 576, 577 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Further, this Court has 
recognized that "[t]he practice of law is not confined to litigation, but extends to 
activities in other fields which entail specialized legal knowledge and ability."  
State v. Buyers Serv. Co., 292 S.C. 426, 430, 357 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1987).  This 
includes the preparation of legal documents "when such preparation involves the 
giving of advice, consultation, explanation, or recommendations on matters of 
law." Franklin v. Chavis, 371 S.C. 527, 531–32, 640 S.E.2d 873, 876 (2007).  
However, "[o]ther than these general statements, there is no comprehensive 
definition of the practice of law." Roberts v. LaConey, 375 S.C. 97, 103, 650 
S.E.2d 474, 477 (2007) (citing Linder v. Insurance Claims Consultants, Inc., 348 
S.C. 477, 487, 560 S.E.2d 612, 617–18 (2002)).   
The absence of a precise definition is deliberate.  This Court has resisted attempts 
to establish a bright-line definition of what constitutes the practice of law, 6 
6 Likewise, other states have also eschewed a rigid definition of what constitutes 
the practice of law in favor of a case-by-case approach.  As the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court has explained: 
We believe it is impossible to frame any comprehensive and 
satisfactory definition of what constitutes the practice of law.  To a 
large extent each case must be decided upon its own particular facts.  
But at least it may be said that in general the practice of directing and 
managing the enforcement of legal claims and the establishment of the 
legal rights of others, where it is necessary to form and to act upon 
opinions as to what those rights are and as to the legal methods which 
must be adopted to enforce them, the practice of giving or furnishing 
legal advice as to such rights and methods and the practice, as an 
occupation, of drafting documents by which such rights are created,
modified, surrendered[,] or secured are all aspects of the practice of 
law. 
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explaining "what constitutes the practice of law must be decided on the facts and in 
the context of each individual case."  Id.  Indeed, in 1992, we declined to adopt a 
set of rules proposed by the South Carolina Bar which were designed to define and 
delineate those activities which constitute the practice of law because we 
determined "it is neither practicable nor wise to attempt a comprehensive definition 
by way of a set of rules." In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 309 S.C. 304, 
305–07, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124–25 (1992).  Instead, we determined "the better course 
is to decide what is and what is not the unauthorized practice of law in the context 
of an actual case or controversy" rather than through an abstract set of guidelines.  
Id.  However, in making our determination, we also urged "any interested 
individual who becomes aware of conduct" that might constitute UPL "to bring a 
declaratory judgment action in this Court's original jurisdiction to determine the 
validity of the conduct." Id. at 307, 422 S.E.2d at 125. And it is pursuant to that 
directive that Homeowners filed this action asking the Court to examine the 
residential mortgage-refinance business model implemented by Quicken Loans and 
Title Source. 
During the last three decades, this Court has explored many times what activities 
constitute the practice of law in the context of a residential real estate transaction.  
Almost thirty years ago, in the seminal case of Buyers Service, we first identified 
four steps in a residential real estate purchase transaction that constitute the 
practice of law and, therefore, must be performed or supervised by a South 
Carolina-licensed attorney: (1) the preparation of "deeds, notes[,] and other 
instruments related to mortgage loans and transfers of real property";7 (2) title 
examination and the "preparation of title abstracts for persons other than 
attorneys";8 (3) overseeing "real estate and mortgage loan closings" and 
"instructing clients in the manner in which to execute legal documents";9 (4) and 
In re Shoe Mfrs. Protective Ass'n, 3 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Mass. 1936) (reaffirmed by 
Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Massachusetts, Inc. v. Nat'l Real Estate Info. Servs., 459 
Mass. 512, 517–18, 946 N.E.2d 665, 674 (2011)).
7 Buyers Serv., 292 S.C. at 430, 357 S.E.2d at 17. 
8 Id. at 432, 357 S.E.2d at 18. 
9 Id. at 433, 357 S.E.2d at 19. 
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giving "instructions to the Clerk of Court or Register of Mesne Conveyances as to 
the manner of recording" documents.10 Buyers Serv., 292 S.C. at 430–34, 357 
S.E.2d at 17–19 (citations omitted).  Thereafter, we recognized a fifth step that 
must be supervised by an attorney—the disbursement of funds.  Doe Law Firm v. 
Richardson, 371 S.C. 14, 18, 636 S.E.2d 866, 868 (2006).  Although we 
acknowledged that the "disbursement of loan proceeds [does not] in and of itself 
'entail[] specialized legal knowledge and ability' such that it constitutes the practice 
of law," we nevertheless explained that "disbursement of funds in the context of a 
residential real estate loan closing cannot and should not be separated from the 
process as a whole." Id. (quoting Buyers Serv., 292 S.C. at 430, 357 S.E.2d at 17)). 
The common thread running through our decisions is the desire to protect the 
public. We determined that UPL claims should be analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis "to strike a proper balance between the legal profession and other 
professionals which will ensure the public's protection from the harms caused by 
the unauthorized practice of law." In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 309 
S.C. at 307, 422 S.E.2d at 125. As the Supreme Court of Georgia has observed 
regarding that state's similar requirement that an attorney oversee real estate 
transactions, "[i]f the attorney fails in his or her responsibility in the closing, the 
attorney may be held accountable through a malpractice or [] disciplinary action.  
In contrast, the public has little or no recourse if a non-lawyer fails to close the 
transaction properly."  In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, 588 S.E.2d 741, 742 
(Ga. 2003). 
Indeed, the goal of consumer protection was at the heart of this Court's reasoning 
10 Id. at 434, 357 S.E.2d at 19. Specifically, as to the fourth step, we explained,  
We do not consider the physical transportation or mailing of 
documents to the courthouse to be the practice of law.  However, 
when this step takes place as part of a real estate transfer, it falls under 
the definition of the practice of law as formulated by this court . . .  It 
is an aspect of conveyancing and affects legal rights.  The appropriate 
sequence of recording is critical in order to protect a purchaser's title 
to property. 
Id. 
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in Buyers Service, no more so than when the Court stated, "The reason preparation 
of instruments by lay persons must be held to constitute the unauthorized practice 
of law is . . . for the protection of the public from the potentially severe economic 
and emotional consequences which may flow from erroneous advice given by 
persons untrained in the law."  292 S.C. at 431, 357 S.E.2d at 18.11  We further 
observed that requiring the closing to be performed by a licensed attorney would 
help ensure the involvement of at least one professional "possessed of the requisite 
skill, competence and ethics," and would provide true accountability by allowing 
meaningful recourse to members of the public.  Id. 
Indeed, the complete lack of attorney involvement was what prompted this Court 
to find UPL had occurred in Buyers Service and in Matrix Financial Services 
Corp. v. Frazer, 394 S.C. 134, 714 S.E.2d 532 (2011).  Buyers Service was a 
commercial title company that, along with a lender, performed entire real estate 
transactions with no attorney oversight. See Buyers Serv., 292 S.C. at 428–29, 357 
S.E.2d at 16–17. The Court determined Buyers Service had committed UPL by 
settling the transactions—including ordering and filling out legal instruments 
relating to the transfer of real property, such as mortgages and deeds; performing 
title searches and creating abstracts to determine ownership of property; giving 
legal advice, including as to how purchasers could acquire fee simple title; 
conducting closings; depositing loan proceeds into its escrow account and 
11 Consistent with our approach, many other states also recognize the primacy of 
consumer protection in residential real estate conveyances and employ a similar 
analysis in determining the appropriate level of attorney involvement in mortgage 
transactions. See, e.g., In re First Escrow, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 839, 843–44 (Mo. 
1992) (recognizing "the need to balance the protection of the public against a 
desire to avoid unnecessary inconvenience and expense" and "the duty to strike a 
workable balance between the public's protection and the public's convenience"); 
Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 733 
(Wash. 1981) (holding lay persons performing tasks relating to real estate 
transactions were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and explaining "[i]t 
is the duty of the court to protect the public from the activity of those who, because
of lack of professional skills, may cause injury whether they are members of the 
bar or persons never qualified for or admitted to the bar." (quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
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disbursing funds; and transferring documents to the land records office for 
recording—without any lawyer input or supervision.12 Id.  Similarly, in Matrix, we 
found the lender engaged in UPL by hiring a non-lawyer "to perform the title 
search, prepare the documents, and close the refinance loan—all admittedly 
without the supervision of a licensed attorney."  394 S.C. at 139, 714 S.E.2d at 
534. We explained, that because the presence of attorneys in real estate closings is 
required for the protection of the public, "[l]enders cannot ignore established laws 
of this state and yet expect this Court to overlook their unlawful disregard."  Id. at
140, 714 S.E.2d at 535. 
As protection of the public is, and has always been, the lodestar of our context-
dependent approach to determining whether an activity constitutes the practice of 
law, this Court has refused to require attorney involvement it did not find 
necessary to protect the public.  For instance, even though the Court has 
determined that, in the context of a real estate transaction, the disbursement of loan 
proceeds must be supervised by an attorney, the Court nevertheless refused to 
"specify the form that supervision must take."  Richardson, 371 S.C. at 18, 636 
S.E.2d at 868. Rather than requiring loan proceeds to pass through a closing 
attorney's trust account, we instead left it up to the supervising attorneys to decide 
how best to satisfy their obligations to their clients.  Id.  Additionally, we have held
that attorney supervision over loan modifications is not required because the cost 
to consumers would be greater than any benefit, given the "the existence of a 
robust regulatory regime and competent non-attorney professionals" involved in 
the loan-modification process. Crawford, 404 S.C. at 47, 744 S.E.2d at 542.
Likewise, in Doe v. McMaster, we found a lawyer's association with a lender and 
title company did not violate "the proscription against the unauthorized practice of 
law." 355 S.C. 306, 316, 585 S.E.2d 773, 778 (2003).  McMaster was a 
declaratory judgment action brought by a lawyer seeking a determination of 
whether his association with a lender and title company was proper under our UPL 
rules. Id. at 309, 585 S.E.2d at 774. We held a lawyer may associate with a lender 
or title company to perform real estate transactions so long as (1) the lawyer 
12 The Court noted that after the proceedings against Buyers Service began, the 
company started using an attorney to review the closing documents.  Buyers Serv., 
292 S.C. at 429, 357 S.E.2d at 16.  However, the attorney answered only to Buyers 
Service and never met with the purchaser. Id. at 429, 357 S.E.2d at 17. 
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"ensure[s] the title search and preparation of loan documents [were] supervised by 
an attorney";13 (2) the lawyer is independent from the lender and "reviews and
corrects, if needed, the [loan] documents [prepared by the lender] to ensure their 
compliance with law";14 (3) the lawyer "supervise[s] the loan's closing and 
provide[s] legal advice to the buyer";15 and (4) the lawyer supervises the recording 
of the mortgage and other documents.16 Id. at 312–16, 585 S.E.2d at 776–78. 
Regarding this last step, the Court held it was sufficient that the lawyer 
"forward[ed] properly executed loan documents to [the title company] with 
specific instructions regarding how, when[,] and where to satisfy the existing first 
mortgage and to record the new mortgage and any assignments, if applicable."17 
See id. at 316, 585 S.E.2d at 778. Thus, a refinance process does not constitute 
UPL as long as a licensed South Carolina attorney is involved at each critical stage 
and exercises independent professional judgment, including making corrections if 
necessary, at the key points throughout the transaction.  To be clear, the lawyer's 
involvement and supervisory role remain vital and necessary; however, this Court 
has never found that, as a matter of consumer protection, attorneys are required to 
personally conduct the myriad clerical tasks required to prepare for a transaction 
closing. 
As a result, in evaluating whether challenged conduct constitutes the unauthorized 
practice of law, this Court carefully considers the specific constellation of facts 
presented and legal rights implicated to determine whether the degree of attorney 
involvement appropriately protects the public from potential legal pitfalls without 
unduly burdening consumer choice or needlessly increasing consumer costs.  It is 
through this lens we must evaluate the procedures employed by Quicken Loans 
and Title Source to determine whether either or both of those entities have engaged 
in UPL in the residential real estate transactions at issue. 
13 McMaster, 355 S.C. at 313, 585 S.E.2d at 776.
14 Id. at 314, 585 S.E.2d at 777. 
15 Id. at 315, 585 S.E.2d at 777. 
16 Id. at 315–16, 585 S.E.2d at 778. 
17 Id. at 310, 585 S.E.2d at 775. According to the stipulated facts the lawyer also 
authorized the lender to disburse funds. See id.
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A. Title Search and Certification 

First, for every transaction challenged in this lawsuit, a South Carolina attorney 
issued a title review certificate saying he had carefully reviewed the records for the 
subject property and made a determination as to the ownership of that property.  
The express purpose of issuing the certificate was "to affirm that the residential 
title work and search were conducted under the supervision of a South Carolina 
attorney." Id.  We do not believe the effectiveness of the title certificates is altered 
by the fact that a non-lawyer created the abstract reviewed by the attorney, for we 
have held that "if a licensed attorney reviews the title abstractor's report and 
vouches for its legal sufficiency by signing the report, title abstractors would not 
be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law."  Ex parte Watson, 356 S.C. 432, 
436, 589 S.E.2d 760, 762 (2003). Moreover, Aylor, the attorney who issued the 
title certificates in this case, testified that he always personally reviewed the 
abstractor's report and only issued a title certificate if he was confident of its legal 
sufficiency. Aylor said he took steps to ensure he complied with all applicable 
laws, including South Carolina's rules on UPL.18  We believe Aylor's conduct 
satisfies the requirement of Buyers Service that examination of title and preparation 
of abstracts only be performed by, or under the supervision of, a licensed attorney.  
See Buyers Service, 292 S.C. at 432–33, 357 S.E.2d at 18–19. 
B. Preparation of Instruments 
Next, although Quicken Loans and Title Source were primarily responsible for 
preparing the loan documents utilized in these refinance transactions, we find the 
legal instruments were adequately reviewed (and corrected if necessary) by 
licensed attorneys prior to the closings.  Although Respondents prepared the forms, 
there is nothing improper about that "as long as an independent attorney reviews 
and corrects, if needed, the documents." McMaster, 355 S.C. at 314, 585 S.E.2d at 
777. Here, the closing attorneys all stated that they reviewed the documents for 
accuracy and compliance with the law prior to closing.     
18 Aylor's contract with Title Source also states that Aylor would be responsible for 
complying with South Carolina's rules regarding UPL, specifically mentioning this 
Court's rulings in Buyers Service and McMaster. 
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C. Closing the Transaction 

As to the closings, we find the record shows all of the loans were closed with 
appropriate attorney supervision.  See Buyers Service, 292 S.C. at 433–34, 357 
S.E.2d at 19 (stating that real estate closings must be supervised by an attorney).  
Each closing attorney signed a Closing Attorney's Statement, indicating he or she 
had reviewed all of the relevant closing documents including the HUD-1 
settlement statement, note, mortgage, and legal description prior to closing.  Each 
attorney also stated that he or she reviewed and explained the documents to the 
borrowers, answered any questions the borrowers asked, and supervised the 
borrowers' execution of the documents.  Because a licensed attorney who had 
previously reviewed the closing documents for accuracy and legal sufficiency was 
physically present at each closing to answer questions and to instruct borrowers in 
the manner in which to execute the closing documents, there is no basis for a 
finding of UPL with respect to this step of the challenged transactions.  Id.; In re 
Lester, 353 S.C. 246, 247, 578 S.E.2d 7, 7 (2003).  
D. Recording and Disbursement 
Finally, we find the record shows lawyers authorized and supervised the recording 
of all necessary documents and the disbursement of funds.  See Richardson, 371 
S.C. at 18, 636 S.E.2d at 868; Buyers Service, 292 S.C. at 434, 357 S.E.2d at 19. 
Each closing attorney testified he or she monitored the disbursement and 
recordation process to ensure the refinance transaction was properly completed in 
compliance with South Carolina law.  Further, the evidence shows that in each loan 
transaction here, the closing attorney authorized Respondents to record documents 
and disburse proceeds with specific instructions for Respondents to return proof of 
recordation and disbursement to the closing lawyer upon completion.  Specifically, 
the closing lawyers insisted on receiving a detailed disbursement ledger showing 
how the loan proceeds were applied, which the lawyers reviewed to confirm loan 
proceeds were disbursed properly.  The closing lawyers also required Respondents 
to provide the recording date and the book and page numbers of the recorded loan 
documents, which the lawyers then used to obtain copies of the recorded loan 
documents to confirm all necessary documents were properly recorded.  Indeed, in 
each of the transactions at issue, the closing attorney's file contained a copy of the 
recorded mortgage. Because the attorneys were required to verify the proper 
disbursement of the loan proceeds and that all of the necessary documents were 
recorded properly in the correct county, there is no basis for finding Respondents 
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committed UPL in this step of the closing process.19 
III. 
Given the extensive evidence of attorney involvement summarized above, we 
declare Respondents' conduct not does not constitute UPL.  It appears Quicken 
Loans, Title Source, and those acting on their behalf took appropriate steps to 
ensure their actions complied with our state's UPL rules, including soliciting 
opinions from other South Carolina attorneys as to what lawyers must do during 
real estate transactions to avoid violating South Carolina's UPL rules.  The record 
further reveals Title Source expected the South Carolina attorneys it engaged to 
take the steps needed to comply with South Carolina law.  We do not suggest that 
such expectations are dispositive.  Rather, these expectations must translate into 
actual compliance with the law.  Here, we are firmly persuaded that, in each of the 
transactions at issue, the residential mortgage refinance practice utilized by 
Quicken Loans and Title Source, which includes direct and independent attorney 
supervision at each critical step, complies with the law.  Because we find Quicken 
Loans and Title Source have honored this Court's precedents requiring attorney 
involvement and allowed those South Carolina attorneys the opportunity to 
independently exercise their professional judgment, we find the process utilized in 
these transactions does not constitute UPL. 
Likewise, other courts have declined to require more robust attorney involvement 
under almost identical facts. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held that a title insurance company which contracted with lenders to 
coordinate settlement services in residential mortgage refinance transactions did 
not engage in UPL by ordering title examinations and abstracts from non-attorney 
third parties or by preparing HUD-1 and other settlement-related documents.  Real 
Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc. v. National Real Estate Information 
19 To the extent this Court's decision in In re Breckenridge, 416 S.C. 466, 787 
S.E.2d 466 (2016), may be read to require the closing attorney utilize his or her 
own trust account to control the disbursement of loan proceeds, we hereby modify 
that decision. In doing so, we reaffirm our holding in Richardson that, in the 
context of a residential real estate loan closing, the disbursement of loan proceeds 
constitutes the practice of law and must be supervised by an attorney.  Richardson, 
371 S.C. at 18, 636 S.E.2d at 868.  The attorney supervision required under 
Respondents' refinance model satisfies the Richardson standard. 
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Services, 946 N.E.2d 665, 677–79 (2011).  In so finding, the court emphasized that 
both the title examination and the closing documents were reviewed by licensed 
Massachusetts attorneys prior to closing and that neither the title company nor the 
lender directed "the attorneys how to conduct the closing or fulfil their legal, 
professional, and ethical obligations."  Id. at 682. So long as a licensed attorney 
interpreted the legal status of title, reviewed the settlement documents prior to 
closing, and remained free to exercise independent judgment in fulfilling their 
professional and ethical obligations, the title insurance company's involvement in 
coordinating the refinance process did not constitute UPL.  As to the issue of 
whether the title insurance company's activities in contracting with licensed 
Massachusetts attorneys to attend real estate closings constituted UPL, the court 
noted that "[w]hen a third party interposes itself between an attorney and a client, 
the key question is who exercises and retains control over the attorney."  Id. at 
682–83. The court acknowledged that a third party "may facilitate the creation of a 
relationship between an attorney and client, and also may pay the legal bills of the 
client. . . . However, there must be a genuine attorney-client relationship, and 
direction and control over the attorney's actions cannot rest with that third party."  
Id. at 683–84 (explaining "[t]he degree of interposition and the facts of each 
individual case play a role in determining whether an inappropriate intermediary 
relationship exists—that is, one in which the intermediary, because of the degree of 
its control over the attorney, is itself deemed to be engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law"). Here, because each attorney involved at every critical point in 
these challenged transactions remained free to exercise his or her independent 
professional judgment, the presence of a third party intermediary (such as Title 
Source) does not transform the practice into UPL.   
Moreover, under the residential mortgage refinance process presented here, we 
believe a finding that Respondents' conduct constituted UPL would mark an 
unwise and unnecessary intrusion into the marketplace.  We believe this is 
especially so, as the attorney involvement and supervision serve the goal of 
protecting the public. Once it is determined that sufficient attorney involvement is 
present and further that the interest of the public is protected, this Court should stay 
its hand and let the marketplace control.  Indeed, there is no allegation here of fault 
in connection with any title search, closing, disbursement or otherwise— 
Homeowners do not allege they were harmed in any way by the Quicken Loans 
model.  To the contrary, one homeowner testified she and her husband had no 
problems with their loan from Quicken Loans and they would refinance with 
Quicken Loans again if Quicken Loans were able to offer them a better interest 
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rate. 
 
Simply put, we believe requiring more attorney involvement in cases such as this 
would belie the Court's oft-stated assertion that UPL rules exist to protect the 
public, not lawyers.  See, e.g., Crawford, 404 S.C. at 45, 744 S.E.2d at 541 ("The 
unauthorized practice of law jurisprudence in South Carolina is driven by the 
public policy of protecting consumers.").  In this context, where there is already "a 
robust regulatory regime[20] and competent non-attorney professionals," id. at 47, 
744 S.E.2d at 542, we do not believe requiring more attorney involvement would 
appreciably benefit the public or justify the concomitant increase in costs and 
reduction in consumer choice or access to affordable legal services.  Cf. In re 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 309 S.C. at 306, 422 S.E.2d at 124–25 
(recognizing the strict licensing requirements for becoming a Certified Public 
Accountant (CPA) and holding "that allowing CPAs to practice in their areas of 
expertise, subject to their own professional regulation, will best serve to both 
protect and promote the public interest"). 
 
 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ISSUED. 
 
BEATTY, C.J., HEARN, FEW, JJ., and Acting Justice Costa M. Pleicones, 
concur. 
20 Quicken is subject to regulation by, among other things, the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank), the Truth in Lending 
Act (TILA), and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).  
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
The Gates at Williams-Brice Condominium Association 
and Katharine Swinson, individually, and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated, Petitioners, 
 
v. 
 
DDC Construction, Inc.; Kapasi Glass Mart, Inc.; DMC 
Consolidated, Inc.; DMC Builders, Co., Inc., individually 
and d/b/a The Dinerstein Companies, DC Developers - 
Columbia Condos, Inc.; Columbia Condos, LP; DMC 
Developers I, Ltd.; 31-W Insulation Company, Inc.; 
Associated Concrete Contractors, Inc.; Bailey Electric 
Company, LLC; C&B Utilities, LP; Carolina Floor 
Systems, Inc.; Century Fire Protection, LLC; Cherokee 
Inc.; Coronado Stucco, LP; Cross Plains Custom Tile, 
Inc.; Lowry Construction & Framing Inc.; LTB 
Construction, Inc.; Martin Morales Jr. Painting & 
Drywall, LLC; Metal Construction Materials, Inc.; 
Southwest Ironworks, Inc.; The Clerkley/Watkins Group, 
LP; Tindall Corporation; Triad Pest Control, Inc.; 
Wyman Acoustics LLC; Alenco Holding Corporation, 
Alenco Window GA, LLC, New AlencoWindow, Ltd.; 
AWC Holding Company; Crosby Window, Inc., f/k/a/ 
Action WinDoor Technology, Inc.; Geo-Systems Design 
& Testing, Inc.; HGE Consulting, Inc.; Maintenance 
Builders Supply, Ltd.; SCA Engineers, Inc.; Sinclair & 
Associates, Inc.; Faultless Hardware, individually and 
d/b/a Pamex Inc.; T & M Concrete, Inc.; Loveless 
Commercial Contracting, Inc.; Economy Waterproofing, 
Inc.; BMC West Corporation; Highway One 
Construction, Inc.; J.I. Windows LLC; Dietrich 
Industries, Inc., a/k/a Dietrich Metal Framing, Inc. n/k/a 
Clarkwestern Dietrich Building Systems LLC; Best 
Masonry and its successor in interest, OldCastle APG; 
Headwaters, Inc. d/b/a Best Masonry; and John Doe #1-
10, Defendants, 
 
Of Whom DDC Construction, Inc. and Columbia 
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Condos, LP, are the Respondents. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-002440 

Lower Court Case No. 2012-CP-40-08512 

ORDER 
Petitioners have filed a motion seeking dismissal of their petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the Court of Appeals, indicating they have entered into a final 
settlement agreement with respondents, and they additionally ask the Court to 
vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals in The Gates at Williams-Brice 
Condominium Association v. DDC Construction, Inc., 418 S.C. 282, 792 S.E.2d 
240 (Ct. App. 2016). Respondents indicate they are not opposed to the requests.  
In response to this Court's inquiry pursuant to Rule 261(d), SCACR, the Court of 
Appeals has recommended that the request to vacate the opinion be granted.  We 
hereby grant the motion, dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari, and vacate the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  C.J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
s/ George C. James, Jr.  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
June 16, 2017 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Jo Pradubsri, Appellant. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000208 
Appeal From Lexington County 

Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge
	
Opinion No. 5499 

Heard November 9, 2016 – Filed July 19, 2017 

AFFIRMED 
Appellate Defender John Harrison Strom, of Columbia, 
for Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of 
Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard, III, of 
Lexington,  for Respondent.
MCDONALD, J.:  Jo Pradubsri appeals his convictions for trafficking in crack
cocaine, possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine within the proximity of a 
school (the proximity charge), and unlawful carrying of a pistol.  Pradubsri argues 
the circuit court erred when it (1) refused to reveal an informant's identity, (2) 
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found reasonable suspicion existed to justify his traffic stop, (3) gave an erroneous 
jury instruction on reasonable doubt, (4) refused to grant a directed verdict on the 
proximity charge, and (5) allowed testimony from a former codefendant that 
Pradubsri manufactured crack cocaine in his residence and participated in a drug 
sale immediately before the traffic stop.  We affirm.
Factual Background 
Around 3:00 a.m. on November 9, 2008, Sergeant John Finch of the Lexington 
County Sheriff's Department stopped Pradubsri's vehicle on St. Andrews Road in 
Irmo based on an informant's tip that the vehicle would likely contain crack 
cocaine and weapons.  Finch conducted the stop as Pradubsri's vehicle exited a 
Kroger parking lot less than half a mile from an elementary school.  Pradubsri was 
driving with his then-girlfriend, Melissa Martin, sitting in the passenger's seat.  
When Finch approached the vehicle, he saw furtive or shuffling movements and 
observed a black 9mm semi-automatic pistol on Pradubsri's side of the car.  As 
Finch removed Pradubsri and Martin from the car, another officer saw that Martin 
had a small baggie in her clinched fist, a baggie in her waistband, and an unnatural 
bulge in her pants. In total, police found four baggies of crack weighing 
approximately seventy-five grams on Martin.  Police also found a smaller .25-
caliber semi-automatic pistol in a purse under a seat.
Law and Analysis 
I. Reasonable Suspicion 
Pradubsri argues police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop 
because the informant's information was neither sufficiently particularized nor 
corroborated. We disagree. 
Before trial,1 the State proffered testimony about the informant, whom Sergeant 
Finch had arrested for drugs and prostitution in the past.  Finch testified he had 
used the informant multiple times before Pradubsri's arrest, he always found her 
1 Pradubsri was initially tried in 2010, but his convictions were reversed after this 
court found the trial court erroneously restricted Martin's cross-examination.  See 
State v. Pradubsri, 403 S.C. 270, 743 S.E.2d 98 (Ct. App. 2013).  A 2014 retrial 
ended in a mistrial.  
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information to be reliable, and she had assisted with several cases involving 
individuals on the "Midland's Most Wanted" list.  
In Pradubsri's case, the informant participated informally by making "ten to 
twenty" phone calls to police over a three-month period.  Through these calls, she 
relayed information about Pradubsri's and Martin's vehicle, their travel plans, their 
nicknames, and the locations where they sold drugs. Specifically, the informant 
told police the pair mostly sold drugs in hotels and motels and "were moving up
and down Bush River [Road] down to St. Andrews [Road] and then back into the 
Irmo area."  The informant also reported where Pradubsri and Martin lived, how 
much cocaine they bought per week, and where it was cooked into crack.
According to the informant, if Pradubsri was driving at night with Martin as his 
passenger, the vehicle would likely contain crack and weapons. The informant 
also identified the weapons: Pradubsri carried a black 9mm Hi-Point semi-
automatic pistol, and Martin had a small silver .25-caliber semi-automatic.  
On the night of the traffic stop, Finch spotted the silver 2001 Chevy Monte Carlo 
with a dent on the front right panel on St. Andrew's Road.  Pradubsri was driving 
and Martin was his passenger.  Finch had previously dealt with both Pradubsri and 
Martin but testified he knew Martin "a little more extensively from the prostitution 
and drugs and on the street."  After Finch and another deputy approached 
Pradubsri's vehicle, Finch saw the handle of a pistol protruding from the gap 
between the driver's seat and the car's center console.2  At this point, Finch ordered 
Pradubsri and Miller to step out of the vehicle, and the deputies found the drugs 
and second weapon. 
Pradubsri moved to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop, arguing 
police did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify 
the stop. The trial court found the stop proper based upon the reliable information 
provided by the informant that Pradubsri and Martin were in engaged in criminal 
activity.
"Our review in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases is limited to 
determining whether any evidence supports the trial court's finding."  State v. 
2 Finch's investigation revealed Pradubsri was a felon who could not legally 
possess a firearm.
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Willard, 374 S.C. 129, 133, 647 S.E.2d 252, 255 (Ct. App. 2007).  "A traffic stop 
is not unreasonable if conducted with probable cause to believe a traffic violation 
has occurred, or when the officer has a reasonable suspicion the occupants are 
involved in criminal activity."  State v. Vinson, 400 S.C. 347, 352, 734 S.E.2d 182, 
184 (Ct. App. 2012). "'Reasonable suspicion' requires a 'particularized and 
objective basis that would lead one to suspect another of criminal activity.'"  State 
v. Khingratsaiphon, 352 S.C. 62, 69, 572 S.E.2d 456, 459 (2002) (quoting United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). "In determining whether reasonable 
suspicion exists, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances."  
Willard, 374 S.C. at 134, 647 S.E.2d at 255.  "Reasonable suspicion is more than a 
general hunch but less than what is required for probable cause."  Id.  "Reasonable 
suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information 
possessed by police and its degree of reliability." Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 
330 (1990). 
In White, police received an anonymous telephone tip that Vanessa White would 
leave a certain apartment complex at a specific time in a brown Plymouth station 
wagon with a broken taillight. 496 U.S. at 327. The tipster further stated White 
would travel to a particular motel and would have about an ounce of cocaine in a 
brown attaché case.  Id.  Police discovered White's vehicle at the apartment 
complex, followed it as it drove the most direct route to the motel, and initiated a 
stop shortly before it reached the motel.  Id.  A consensual search revealed 
marijuana in a brown attaché case and cocaine in White's purse. Id.  The United 
States Supreme Court held that at the time of the stop "the anonymous tip had been 
sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that [White] was engaged 
in criminal activity."  Id. at 331. While acknowledging that not every detail 
mentioned by the tipster was verified, the Supreme Court placed particular 
importance on the tipster's ability to predict White's future behavior "because it 
demonstrated inside information—a special familiarity with [White's] affairs."  Id.
at 331–32.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded "[w]hen significant aspects 
of the caller's predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that 
the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to 
justify the stop." Id. at 332. 
However, in State v. Green, this court held an anonymous caller who gave police a 
tip that Green was carrying a large sum of money and narcotics along with Green's 
name, a description of his car, and the location he would be departing did not 
"supply sufficient indicia of reliability to establish reasonable suspicion to justify 
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an investigatory stop."  341 S.C. 214, 218, 532 S.E.2d 896, 897 (Ct. App. 2000).  
This court noted the caller's information was readily observable and provided no 
predictive information, especially when the location from which the defendant 
departed had only two possible exits and the officer had no reason, aside from the 
tip, to suspect criminal activity.  Id. at 218, 532 S.E.2d at 897–98. Significantly, 
this court stated, "Since the telephone call was anonymous, the caller did not place 
his credibility at risk and could lie with impunity.  Therefore, [the court] cannot 
judge the credibility of the caller, and the risk of fabrication becomes 
unacceptable." Id. at 218, 532 S.E.2d at 898.     
Conversely, in State v. Rogers, an officer received information from a known 
informant concerning the location of a planned robbery, the individuals involved, 
and the vehicle they would be driving.  368 S.C. 529, 532, 629 S.E.2d 679, 681 
(Ct. App. 2006). The officer later received a dispatch about the robbery and found 
and stopped the car described by the informant.  Id. at 531–32, 629 S.E.2d at 681.  
On appeal from the denial of Rogers's motion to suppress, this court found Green
"clearly distinguishable" because it involved an investigatory stop based on an 
anonymous tip, as opposed to information from a known and reliable informant 
whom police had used in the past. Id. at 535, 629 S.E.2d at 682.  Specifically, the 
court stated the officer "received the information from a known, accountable 
informant whose reputation could be assessed and who explained how he knew 
about the planned robbery, thereby supplying a basis, outside of his already proven 
reliability, for [the officer] to believe the confidential informant had inside 
information on the matter."  Id.
More recently, in State v. Pope, an informant facing a drug charge arranged a drug 
sale with the defendant in exchange for a bond reduction.  410 S.C. 214, 219–20, 
763 S.E.2d 814, 817 (Ct. App. 2014).  The informant described the make, model, 
and color of Pope's vehicle, as well as the highway and direction in which Pope 
would be traveling with more than one person.  Id. at 220, 763 S.E.2d at 817.  The 
informant also called Pope while he was in route to the sale and relayed his 
specific location to police. Id.  When police stopped the vehicle and conducted 
warrantless searches of the vehicle and its occupants, they discovered drug residue, 
scales, and cash. Later, upon searching the car that transported two of Pope's 
companions to the detention center, a deputy discovered a yellow bag containing a 
little more than eleven grams of crack cocaine.  Id. at 220–21, 763 S.E.2d at 817– 
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18.3  On appeal, this court found reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic stop 
because police were able to corroborate the informant's description of the vehicle, 
the highway and direction of the vehicle, the location of the vehicle at a specific 
time, and the fact that more than one person would be in the vehicle.  Id. at 225, 
763 S.E.2d at 820. 
Likewise, the evidence here supports the circuit court's finding that police had 
reasonable suspicion to stop the Pradubsri vehicle.  Willard, 374 S.C. at 133, 647 
S.E.2d at 255. Finch's in camera testimony revealed the informant provided police 
with the following information: Pradubsri's and Martin's nicknames were JoJo and 
Magic, they drove a silver 2001 Chevy Monte Carlo with a dent on the front right 
panel, they sold drugs "moving up and down Bush River [Road] down to St. 
Andrews [Road] and then back into the Irmo area," they lived off of Lord Howe 
Road, they cooked the cocaine into crack at their home, and they were more likely 
to be dealing drugs at night when Pradubsri was driving and Martin was in the 
passenger seat. The informant also specified the vehicle would contain crack, a 
black 9mm pistol, and a silver .25-caliber semi-automatic weapon.  
Given these facts, evidence supports the circuit court's decision that under the 
totality of the circumstances, the police had reasonable suspicion for the traffic 
stop. See Willard, 374 S.C. at 134, 647 S.E.2d at 255.  This case is somewhat 
unique because the informant here did not give as much predictive information as 
the tipster in White and because the informant provided her information to law 
enforcement over some three months before Pradubsri's vehicle was located and 
stopped. However, given that the informant's identity was known to law 
enforcement and she had a history of providing reliable information, Finch was
justified in making the stop once he saw Pradubsri driving a vehicle matching the 
informant's description in the small, identified area at a time when the informant 
had reported drugs and two specified weapons would very likely be in the vehicle.  
See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972) (stating an unverified tip 
from a known informant may not have been sufficient to establish probable cause 
but carried enough indicia of reliability to justify a forcible stop and frisk); Rogers, 
368 S.C. at 535, 629 S.E.2d at 682 (holding reasonable suspicion existed when a 
police officer stopped a vehicle after receiving information from a known and 
accountable informant whose reputation could be assessed); Florida v. J.L., 529 
3 The court of appeals further upheld the warrantless searches of the vehicle and 
found a complete chain of custody was established for the cocaine. 
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U.S. 266, 276 (2000) ("If an informant places his anonymity at risk, a court can 
consider this factor in weighing the reliability of the tip.").  Accordingly, we affirm 
the circuit court's denial of Pradubsri's motion to suppress the evidence seized 
during the traffic stop. 
II. Reasonable Doubt Charge 
Pradubsri argues the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that reasonable doubt 
"is doubt which makes an honest, sincere, conscientious juror in search of the truth 
hesitate to act." He further challenges the circuit court's language instructing the 
jury to "to evaluate the evidence and determine that evidence which convinces you 
of its truth" and that "it is your duty to determine the effect, the value, weight, and 
the truth of the evidence presented during trial."  We find no reversible error.  
During the charge conference, Pradubsri moved to exclude any jury charge 
language referencing a "search for the truth," arguing it improperly shifted the 
State's burden of proof as forbidden by State v. Daniels.4  After a colloquy, the 
circuit court agreed to remove this line from the charge.  Nevertheless, the circuit 
court charged the jury, "A reasonable doubt is doubt which makes an honest, 
sincere, conscientious juror in search of the truth to hesitate to act."  Pradubsri 
objected, but the circuit court overruled the objection and denied a subsequent 
motion for a mistrial.  
"The standard for review of an ambiguous jury instruction is whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that 
violates the Constitution." State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 27, 538 S.E.2d 248, 251 
(2000). "In reviewing jury charges for error, this [c]ourt must consider the [trial] 
court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial."  
State v. Simmons, 384 S.C. 145, 178, 682 S.E.2d 19, 36 (Ct. App. 2009).  "If, as a 
whole, the charges are reasonably free from error, isolated portions which might be 
misleading do not constitute reversible error."  Id.  "A jury charge is correct if, 
when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and 
4 401 S.C. 251, 256, 737 S.E.2d 473, 475 (2012) (instructing a trial judge to 
remove language from his charge that told the jury to reach a verdict that would 
represent truth and justice for all parties because such language could alter the 
jury's perception of the burden of proof).
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adequately covers the law."  Id. "To warrant reversal, a [trial] court's refusal to 
give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the 
defendant." Id.
Recently, in State v. Beaty, a circuit court used "truth seeking" language in its 
preliminary jury remarks.  Op. No. 27693 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 29, 2016) 
(Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 1 at 13–14), reh'g granted Mar. 24, 2017.  On appeal, our 
supreme court explained,  
[A] trial court should refrain from informing the jury, 
whether through comments or through its charge, that its 
role is to search for the truth, or to find the true facts, or 
to render a just verdict.  These phrases may be 
understood to place an obligation on the jury, 
independent of the burden of proof, to determine the 
circumstances surrounding the alleged crime and from
those facts alone render the verdict it believes best serves 
the jury's perception of justice. We caution trial judges 
to avoid these terms and any other that may divert the 
jury from its obligation in a criminal case to determine, 
based solely on the evidence presented, whether the State 
has proven the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Id. at 15–16. Nevertheless, the supreme court held the defendant was unable to 
show prejudice from the comments sufficient to warrant reversal.  Id. at 16. 
Beaty echoes the supreme court's previous admonition against such language in 
State v. Needs, 333 S.C. 134, 508 S.E.2d 857 (1998).  Needs addressed a 
circumstantial evidence charge and the following reasonable doubt charge: 
[A] reasonable doubt is a doubt which makes an honest, 
sincere, conscientious juror in search of the truth in the 
case hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character 
that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and to 
act upon it in the most important of his or her own 
affairs. 
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Id. at 152, 508 S.E.2d at 866. 
Needs urged trial courts to avoid using such language but ultimately upheld the 
conviction because the circuit court reiterated the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard twenty-six times and the rest of the charge did not contain other 
disfavored language—particularly the "moral certainly" and "real reason" language 
found in State v. Manning.5 See Needs, 333 S.C. at 154–55, 508 S.E.2d at 867–68.
In Pradubsri's case, the circuit court used truth-seeking language almost identical to 
that challenged in Needs. However, the circuit court referenced the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard at least twenty times during its instructions.  Further, 
the instructions did not contain Manning's disfavored language.  See Needs, 333 
S.C. at 155, 508 S.E.2d at 867 (holding a charge was harmless partly because "it 
did not contain . . . troubling language identified in Manning"); see also State v. 
Kirkpatrick, 320 S.C. 38, 46, 462 S.E.2d 884, 889 (Ct. App. 1995) (noting a charge
was not defective partly because it lacked "language found objectionable in the 
Manning case"). 
In considering Pradubsri's argument that the challenged language improperly 
shifted the State's burden of proof, we note the circuit court stated, "The Defendant
is not required to prove his innocence.  The burden of proof remains on the State to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  Additionally, the circuit court instructed, 
"The presumption of innocence is like a robe of righteousness placed about the 
shoulders of the Defendant[,] which remains with the Defendant until it has been 
stripped from the Defendant by evidence satisfying you of the Defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our review of the record and the entire charge 
reveals no prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal.  See Beaty, No. 1 at 16
(reviewing the trial court's comments and the entire trial record and concluding 
there was no prejudice from the trial court's error sufficient to warrant reversal); 
Simmons, 384 S.C. at 178, 682 S.E.2d at 36 (holding appellate courts must
consider the trial court's jury charge as a whole); id. ("If, as a whole, the charges 
5 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E.2d 372 (1991).
87 

  
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
                                        
 
 
are reasonably free from error, isolated portions which might be misleading do not 
constitute reversible error.").6 
III. Remaining Issues 
As to the remaining issues, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the 
following authorities: 
1. As to Pradubsri's argument that the circuit court erred in refusing to reveal the 
informant's identity, we find the circuit court acted within its discretion. See State 
v. Humphries, 354 S.C. 87, 90, 579 S.E.2d 613, 615 (2003) ("[I]f the informant is 
an active participant in the criminal transaction and/or a material witness on the 
issue of guilt or innocence, disclosure of his identity may be required depending 
upon the facts and circumstances.  On the other hand, an informant's identity need 
not be disclosed where he possesses only a peripheral knowledge of the crime or is 
a mere 'tipster' who supplies a lead to law enforcement."); id. at 90, 579 S.E.2d at 
614–15 ("The burden is upon the defendant to show the facts and circumstances 
entitling him to the disclosure."); id. at 90, 579 S.E.2d at 615 (holding a trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informant's name).   
2. As to Pradubsri's argument that the circuit court erred in refusing to grant a 
directed verdict on the proximity charge, we find the charge was correctly
submitted to the jury. See State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593, 606 S.E.2d 475, 
477–78 (2004) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is 
concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. at 
593–94, 606 S.E.2d at 478 ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial 
6 We find unpreserved Pradubsri's arguments that the circuit court erred in 
instructing the jury to determine "the effect, the value, weight and the truth of the 
evidence presented" and that it was the jury's duty to "determine that evidence 
which convinces you of its truth" because Pradubsri's trial objection related only to 
the "search for the truth" language.  However, even if the other "truth" references 
are considered, the instructions as a whole adequately covered the law and do not 
warrant reversal. See Simmons, 384 S.C. at 178, 682 S.E.2d at 36. 
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circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an 
appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury.").7 
3. As to Pradubsri's argument that the circuit court erred in allowing Martin to 
testify about Pradubsri's prior bad acts, we find the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing the testimony.  See State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 
S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the 
trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Sweat, 
362 S.C. 117, 127, 606 S.E.2d 508, 513 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Evidence is admissible 
if 'logically relevant' to establish a material fact or element of the crime; it need not 
be 'necessary' to the State's case in order to be admitted."). 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Pradubsri's convictions are  
AFFIRMED.     
LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS, J., concur.   
7 Further, we note the version of the statute that governed the proximity charge at 
the time of Pradubsri's arrest did not contain a knowledge requirement and made it 
a crime to "unlawfully possess with intent to distribute, a controlled substance 
while in, on, or within a one-half mile radius of the grounds of 
a[n] . . . elementary . . . school . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-445 (2002).  The 
statute was rewritten in 2010 and now requires that a person "have knowledge that 
he is in, on, or within a one-half mile radius of the grounds of a public or private 
elementary . . . school . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-445(B)(1) (Supp. 2016).  
However, this new requirement has no bearing on Pradubsri's case.  See State v. 
Henkel, 413 S.C. 9, 11 n.4, 774 S.E.2d 458, 460 n.4 (2015) (stating a statute that 
was amended in 2009 was not applicable when the defendant's arrest occurred in 
2008).
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LEE, A.J.:  In this appeal arising from a premises liability lawsuit, Avtex 
Commercial Properties, Inc. (Avtex) argues the trial court erred in denying its 
motion to disclose settlement and motion for setoff. We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
William Huck slipped and fell while walking into Wild Wing Café in Mount 
Pleasant. Huck and his wife, Dianne Huck, filed a complaint against Wild Wing 
Café and Avtex, as the building's owner, among other parties.  Huck alleged he 
suffered bodily injury, causing him to have surgery and incur medical costs.  Huck 
asserted causes of action for negligence and loss of consortium.  Dianne also 
asserted a cause of action for loss of consortium.  Prior to trial, a settlement was 
entered into with defendants Civil Site Environmental, Inc. and Chandler 
Construction Services, Inc. The terms of the settlement, including the amounts, 
were not disclosed to the trial court.  At the close of the Hucks' case, the court 
granted the remaining defendants' motions for directed verdict on Dianne's loss of 
consortium claim. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Huck against Avtex only in the amount of 
$97,640, but the jury found Huck was fifty percent negligent in bringing about his
own injuries.  Accordingly, the court reduced the verdict by fifty percent to 
$48,820 and entered judgment against Avtex in that amount.  Avtex filed a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b), SCRCP.  It also 
filed a motion for disclosure of settlement and setoff, or in the alternative, to 
determine if the settlement was made in good faith.  The trial court denied both 
motions.  Avtex made a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), 
SCRCP, which the trial court denied.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried by a jury, the jurisdiction of this 
Court extends merely to the correction of errors of law."  Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. 
City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 85, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976).  "[A] factual 
finding of the jury will not be disturbed unless a review of the record discloses that 
there is no evidence which reasonably supports the jury's findings."  Id.
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Motion to Disclose Settlement
Avtex argues the trial court erred in denying its motion to disclose settlement.  We 
agree. 
"In interpreting the language of a court rule, we apply the same rules of
construction used in interpreting statutes."  Green ex rel. Green v. Lewis Truck 
Lines, Inc., 314 S.C. 303, 304, 443 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1994).  "In construing a 
statute, its words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting 
to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation."  City of 
Camden v. Brassell, 326 S.C. 556, 561, 486 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ct. App. 1997).  
"When the language of a court rule is clear and unambiguous, the court is obligated 
to follow its plain and ordinary meaning."  Stark Truss Co. v. Superior Constr. 
Corp., 360 S.C. 503, 508, 602 S.E.2d 99, 102 (Ct. App. 2004).   
Rule 8 of the South Carolina Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules provides:  
Communications during a mediation settlement 
conference shall be confidential. Additionally, the 
parties, their attorneys and any other person present must 
execute an Agreement to Mediate that protects the 
confidentiality of the process.  To that end, the parties 
and any other person present shall maintain the 
confidentiality of the mediation and shall not rely on, or 
introduce as evidence in any arbitral, judicial or other 
proceeding, any oral or written communications having 
occurred in a mediation proceeding . . . . 
Rule 8(a), SCADR (emphases added). 
This court must give the words of Rule 8 their plain and ordinary meaning without 
resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the rule.  See Green, 314 
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S.C. at 304, 443 S.E.2d at 907; Stark Truss Co., 360 S.C. at 508, 602 S.E.2d at 
102. 
Avtex argues the trial court erred in concluding the South Carolina rules governing 
alternative dispute resolution prevented it from compelling disclosure of the terms
of the settlements between the Hucks and Civil Site Environmental, Inc. and 
Chandler Construction Services, Inc.  The Hucks argue the settlement agreement is 
protected because it was a part of the mediation process. 
We find the trial court erred in denying Avtex's motion to disclose settlement.  The 
documents referred to in Rule 8 are designed to protect any documents prepared 
for use by the mediator and the parties to the mediation itself.  Once the parties 
reach a settlement, documents prepared in conjunction with the settlement and 
release are not for the purpose of, or in the course of, mediation.  Rather, they are 
documents prepared in connection with the litigation and to bring the litigation to a 
close. Rule 8 is designed to protect the communications made during the 
mediation itself and to protect the process.  The parties' mediation agreement 
reinforces the rule and simply incorporates the same language. The request for 
production of the settlement documents does not disclose confidential information 
from the mediation (i.e., it does not disclose or discuss information the parties 
utilized to reach the settlement).  Further, any confidential matters the parties do 
not want disclosed can be protected through court proceedings including 
confidentiality provisions. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court on this issue. 
II. Motion for Setoff
Avtex argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for setoff.  We agree. 
"A nonsettling defendant is entitled to credit for the amount paid by another 
defendant who settles." Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 312, 536 S.E.2d 408, 425 
(Ct. App. 2000) (citing Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 155, 156 S.E.2d 759, 761 
(1967) ("[T]he rule is almost universally followed that one [tortfeasor] is entitled to 
credit for the amount paid by another [tortfeasor] for a covenant not to sue.")).  
"The reason for allowing such a credit is to prevent an injured person from 
obtaining a second recovery of that part of the amount of damages sustained which 
has already been paid to him." Truesdale v. S.C. Highway Dep't, 264 S.C. 221, 
235, 213 S.E.2d 740, 746 (1975), overruled on other grounds by McCall ex rel. 
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Andrews, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985), superseded by statute. "In other 
words, there can be only one satisfaction for an injury or wrong."  Welch, 342 S.C. 
at 312, 536 S.E.2d at 425. "However, the reduction in the judgment must be from 
a settlement for the same cause of action." Id. 
 
Section 15-38-50 of the South Carolina Code (2005) provides: 
 
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce 
judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more 
persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same 
wrongful death: 
 
(1) it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from 
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms 
so provide, but it reduces the claim against the others to 
the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the 
covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for 
it, whichever is the greater; and 
 
(2) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from 
all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor. 
 
"Section 15-38-50 grants the court no discretion in determining the equities 
involved in applying a [setoff] once a release has been executed in good faith 
between a plaintiff and one of several joint tortfeasors."  Vortex Sports & Entm't, 
Inc. v. Ware, 378 S.C. 197, 210, 662 S.E.2d 444, 451 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting 
Ellis v. Oliver, 335 S.C. 106, 113, 515 S.E.2d 268, 272 (Ct. App. 1999)).  When 
the settlement is for the same injury as a matter of law, "the right to setoff arises as 
an operation of law, and the circuit court must award a setoff."  Smith v. Widener, 
397 S.C. 468, 474, 724 S.E.2d 188, 191 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 
Avtex argues it is entitled to a setoff to account for the amounts Civil Site 
Environmental, Inc. and Chandler Construction Services, Inc. each paid the Hucks 
to settle the claims against them.  Avtex asserts the Hucks allocated a substantial 
percentage of the settlement with Civil Site Environmental, Inc. and Chandler 
Construction Services, Inc. to Dianne's loss of consortium claim in an effort to 
deprive Avtex of a setoff. Therefore, Avtex argues the trial court erred in finding it 
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"has no jurisdiction to evaluate the 'fairness' or 'reasonableness' of such settlement 
agreements or to reallocate the settlements, assuming there is anything to 
reallocate," and "[n]othing in the law or at equity permits this court to conduct such
an inquiry."  The Hucks argue the trial court did not have any authority to 
reapportion the settlement proceeds. 
Pursuant to section 15-38-50, we agree Avtex is entitled to a setoff.  It was the trial 
court's function to determine the amount of the setoff.  To determine if the 
nonsettling tortfeasor is entitled to a setoff as a preliminary matter, the documents 
must be reviewed to determine if their terms shield the settling tortfeasor from the 
requirements of section 15-38-50(2).  Therefore, the court must review the 
documents to determine the amount of the settlement and its terms.  Under section 
15-38-50, the court also must determine if the release or covenant was "given in 
good faith."  Because the trial court did not conduct such a review, we remand the 
case for the trial court to look at the settlement agreement and determine if Avtex 
is entitled to a setoff. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the trial court's order is 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
WILLIAMS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 
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HILL, J.: After a joint trial, Lorenzo Young and Trenton Barnes were convicted by 
a jury of murder, kidnapping, second-degree burglary, and attempted armed robbery.  
On appeal, Young argues the trial court abused its discretion in (1) admitting a letter 
written by Barnes as a statement against penal interest, Rule 804(b)(3), SCRE; and 
(2) failing to grant his motion for mistrial.  We find the letter was admitted in error, 
and the error was not cured by the trial court's instruction to disregard the letter.  We
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conclude, however, that the error in admitting the letter and any error in failing to 
grant a mistrial was harmless. We therefore affirm Young's convictions and 
sentences. 
I. 
Kelly Hunnewell worked for Carolina Cafe in Columbia as a baker and cook.  
Hunnewell's shift started early in the morning, and she baked at a remote kitchen 
located at 93 Tommy Circle. The kitchen was next door to the Ale House Lounge, 
and both buildings were equipped with video surveillance.   
According to the surveillance video and other evidence, Hunnewell arrived at the 
kitchen at 3:00 a.m. on July 1, 2013. It was raining hard outside, and she left the 
door to the kitchen propped open. At 3:40 a.m., while Hunnewell was stirring 
potatoes, a man wearing a red-hooded sweatshirt entered the open door, followed 
closely by a man wearing a gray-hooded sweatshirt. Both men had their sweatshirts 
pulled tightly around their faces. Each held a gun in what appeared to be a gloved 
hand. At the same time, a third man, wearing a dark-hooded sweatshirt, appeared at
the door. The man in the red sweatshirt immediately ran up behind Hunnewell and 
placed his gun to her head. The man in the gray sweatshirt ran to the other side of 
Hunnewell, blocking any means for her escape. A brief struggle ensued, and 
Hunnewell attempted to fend off her assailants with a large spoon. During the 
struggle, both men fired their weapons. Hunnewell fell to the ground, and at 3:41 
a.m., the men fled. 
A neighbor who heard the gunshots and Hunnewell's screams called the police.  
Officer Jonathan Brayboy received the call from dispatch at 3:44 a.m., and arrived 
promptly to find Hunnewell lying on the floor. It was later determined she had died 
almost instantly from a .40 caliber gunshot wound to her chest and neck. Police 
officers discovered six bullet casings at the scene—four .45 caliber GAP casings and 
two Smith & Wesson .40 caliber casings. Police swabbed for DNA, canvassed the 
neighborhood for information related to the crime, and released portions of the 
surveillance video to the media.   
Tips began to trickle in. Mary Brown, a resident of the neighborhood where Barnes 
and Young lived, called the police tip line after seeing the surveillance video on the 
news. Brown testified that on the afternoon before the shooting, she was at a cookout
also attended by two young men: one was wearing a gray-hooded jacket or hoodie, 
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the other a red one. At the time, she did not know who the men were but later 
identified them to police.1 
Donald Moore, who knew Young "from the street" and described Barnes and Troy 
Stevenson, Barnes' brother, as his friends, approached the police on July 2nd. In his 
statement, Moore informed the police that a few days before the shooting, he was 
present when Troy and Young were discussing a plan to rob the Ale House.  He 
stated Young had acquired a Glock 40 and was showing it on the street. Moore 
stated Young wore the red-hooded sweatshirt seen on the video, and Troy often wore 
the gray one. Finally, Moore stated that after viewing the surveillance video, he 
believed Troy and Young were the shooters. At trial, Moore recanted his entire 
statement, testifying he had lied to police.      
On July 5th, Investigators executed a search warrant at Young's house and recovered 
five gloves from Young's closet that later tested positive for gunshot residue, two 
unfired .45 caliber GAP rounds of ammunition, an empty Glock magazine, and a .40 
caliber Smith & Wesson unfired round. Police searched Barnes' home pursuant to 
warrant the same day, recovering a "soaking wet" dark hoodie. Barnes, who was
sixteen at the time, was arrested at his home, which was within walking distance of 
the scene. Young was arrested later that evening, found hiding in an upstairs closet 
of his cousin's home.  
Latoya Barnes, Barnes' mother, testified she was home the night of the shooting and 
her two sons, Barnes and Troy, were there as well. According to Latoya, around 
11:00 p.m. or midnight, Barnes and Young left the house together, while Troy had 
departed earlier with another group of friends. Latoya testified Young was wearing 
a red sweatshirt, Troy was wearing a dark sweatshirt, and Barnes was wearing a gray 
one. Troy eventually returned home with his friends, but Barnes and Young had still 
not returned at 2:00 or 3:00 a.m.  Around that time, Latoya stated Young called and 
asked to speak with one of Troy's friends who was present at Latoya's home; she 
gave the friend the phone. Later, Latoya received another call from Young, asking 
for that same friend. Latoya testified she asked Young, "Where is [Barnes]?" Young 
replied Barnes was with him "right down the street." Latoya asked Young to tell 
Barnes to come home.  When Barnes did not immediately return home, Latoya told 
Troy to go "get your brother." Troy then left the house and Latoya went to bed.  
Latoya testified that when she awoke at 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, Barnes, Young, 
1 Due to a sustained objection, Brown was not permitted to testify to the actual 
identities of the men, just that she was able to identify them to the police.   
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and Troy were all at her home. Shortly thereafter, someone came by and picked 
Young up.
At trial, the State questioned Latoya about a statement she gave to police after her
sons were arrested, identifying Barnes as the person in the video wearing the gray 
hoodie. Latoya denied identifying Barnes. Later in the trial, the State played  a  
portion of Latoya's recorded statement to police in which she identified Barnes as
the person in the video, stating, "Yeah, I mean it was [Barnes] with the gray on.  
Like I said, I know my kids' build. I know them from their fingers to their toes. I
know my kids."   
Additionally, Latoya testified she received a letter from Barnes dated March 31,
2014, while he was in the detention center. Over Young's objection that it was 
inadmissible hearsay and violated Bruton v. United States,2 the letter was entered
into evidence. In the letter, Barnes admitted his role in the shooting and implicated 
Young. A handwriting expert testified the letter was written by Barnes. After an
overnight recess, the trial court instructed the jury the letter could not be used as 
evidence against Young. Young objected to the instruction and moved for a mistrial.  
Young's girlfriend, Rolanda Coleman, testified that at the time of the shooting, she 
and Young were living together with their infant daughter. Speaking with police a 
week after the shooting, Coleman stated Young had acquired a gun a month or two
before the incident. Coleman testified that on the night of the shooting, she was at 
her home and Young was at Latoya's home. According to her statement, Coleman 
received a call from Young the next morning asking for a ride home. Young's 
mother picked him up from Barnes' home, and when he returned, Young had a gun 
that he wrapped in a shirt and placed in the baby's crib.3 Young described the gun 
to Coleman as a "45." Coleman and Young then went to work; when they returned 
home, the gun was gone.   After Young and his mother saw the surveillance video 
of the shooting on the news, Coleman overheard Young's mother tell him to get rid 
of the gun. Coleman also testified Barnes often wore a gray-hooded sweatshirt, and 
she had previously seen Barnes with a gun. Upon seeing the video of the shooting,
Coleman identified Barnes as the person wearing the gray sweatshirt.  She testified
she could not identify the person in the red sweatshirt. Coleman admitted that at the 
2 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

3 Coleman testified the baby was staying with her grandmother at the time.    
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time of trial, she had pending charges for burglary in the first degree but claimed the 
State had made no promises to her in exchange for her testimony.4 
Evidence from Young's cell phone was also admitted. The call log corroborated 
Latoya's and Coleman's testimony regarding calls made by Young on the evening 
and morning of the shooting. The phone also contained several cached photographs 
from internet searches beginning the day of the shooting, including portions of the
video and still pictures of the man in the red sweatshirt from the police media release.  
Investigators also discovered a video on the cell phone recorded five days before the 
shooting. This video, which was published for the jury, depicted Young in a gray 
sweatshirt displaying a gun—which he called a "Glock 4-5"—for the camera.  
Next, the State presented the testimony of three jailhouse informants. Alfred 
Dominique Wright testified Young approached him in the jail's law library asking 
for help with his case. According to Wright, Young told him what happened the
night of the shooting, implicating both himself and two brothers nicknamed "Trigg 
and Trap." Wright testified he later learned Trigg and Trap were Troy and Barnes.   
Michael Peterson testified that while he and Young were housed in the same unit of 
the detention center, Young approached him to talk about his case. Peterson testified 
Young described the shooting incident, implicating himself and another person 
Young called "his little homey." Peterson further testified that later, while in the 
shower, he overheard a nervous-sounding Young "hollering back and forth" with 
Troy about evidence collected in the case, explaining that all the police had 
recovered were shell casings. 
Michael Schaefer testified he knew Young because they were housed in the same 
dorm in jail. Schaefer testified Young told him about the shooting, implicating 
himself and "Trap and Trigg." According to Schaefer, on one occasion, Young told
him, "I shouldn't have shot that bitch."    
Finally, the State presented testimony from a firearms and tool marks examination 
expert and a DNA expert. The firearms expert testified GAP .45 bullets, like the 
ones found at the scene and at Young's house, were typically used by law
enforcement rather than civilians and could only be fired by a Glock-manufactured 
gun. The DNA expert testified she could not exclude either Barnes or Young from 
a DNA sample recovered from the spoon Hunnewell used to hit her assailants.  
4  Young and Coleman were codefendants for the burglary charges, but the trial 
court did not permit reference about Young being charged.   
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However, on cross-examination, the expert admitted one-third of the world   
population could not be excluded as contributors.  Neither the guns nor the red and 
gray hoodies were ever found.    
  
Neither Barnes nor Young presented evidence, and instead challenged the State's 
proof.  At the close of trial, the trial court charged "hand of one, hand of all" liability 
in addition to murder, kidnapping, second-degree burglary, and attempted armed 
robbery.  After deliberating around three hours, the jury found Barnes and Young 
guilty of all counts.  Young received consecutive sentences of life without the 
possibility of parole for murder, twenty years for attempted armed robbery, and 
fifteen years for burglary.  Barnes was sentenced consecutively to fifty years for 
murder, twenty years for attempted armed robbery, and fifteen years for burglary.   
 
II. 
 
Young argues the trial court erred in admitting Barnes' letter to his mother   as a   
statement against penal interest pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3), SCRE, which provides: 
 
(b) Hearsay Exceptions.  The following are not excluded 
by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness: 
 
. . . . 
 
(3) Statement Against Interest.  A statement which was at 
the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to 
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to 
render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, 
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would 
not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. 
A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal 
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
 
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), is the starting point for 
considering admissibility of statements against penal interest.  The case involved 
lengthy statements made by Williamson's accomplice, Harris, which had been 
admitted as evidence against Williamson in his separate trial.  Id. at 596-98.  The 
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Court began by holding that the term "statement" as used in the text of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 804(b)(3) refers to a "single declaration or remark." Id. at 599–600.  
Rejecting the broader construction that a "statement" can encompass a narrative or 
extended declaration, the Court reasoned: 
Rule 804(b)(3) is founded on the commonsense notion that 
reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not 
especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory 
statements unless they believe them to be true. This notion 
simply does not extend to the broader definition of 
"statement." The fact that a person is making a broadly 
self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible 
the confession's non-self-inculpatory parts.  One of  the  
most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, 
especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because
of its self-inculpatory nature. 
Id. Williamson recognized that Rule 804(b)(3) is an attempt to reconcile two creeds 
of witness reliability courts have long sustained. The first is the principle upon 
which the rule was founded: that people do not often falsely accuse themselves or 
say things that harm their interests, so such statements are naturally credible. The 
second is the belief that an accomplice's statement that accuses another is inherently 
unreliable. See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986). Williamson confronts the 
issue of what courts should do when the same person makes both types of statements.
Wigmore believed that because the declarant was speaking while in a trustworthy
state of mind indicating his "sincerity and accuracy," then whatever a declarant says
when "under that influence" should be admitted. 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1465, p. 
339 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974). Williamson avoided Wigmore's hypnosis-like view, 
which seems designed more for a circus tent than a tribunal, and crafted an approach 
that more realistically accounts for human nature: that when speaking of their 
criminal activity, people often speak out of both sides of their mouth. Williamson 
instructs how to apply Rule 804(b)(3) when a remark considered so reliable as to be
naturally credible (i.e., no one would say it unless it was true) is coupled with one 
long held to be conspicuously unreliable (i.e., no one who says that can be trusted):   
In our view, the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is 
that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory 
statements, even if they are made within a broader 
narrative that is generally self-inculpatory. The district
court may not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3) 
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that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a 
fuller confession, and this is especially true when the 
statement implicates someone else. 
 
512 U.S. at 600–01. 
 
Our supreme court adopted the Williamson approach in State v. Fuller, 337 S.C. 236, 
244–45, 523 S.E.2d 168, 172 (1999).  We interpret the rule allowing statements 
against penal interest stringently.  Fuller emphasized the "strict requirements" of the 
rule.  Id. at 245, 523 S.E.2d at 172.  State v. Holmes reaffirmed Fuller and stressed 
the rule is to be applied "very narrowly to only those portions of a hearsay statement 
which are plainly self-inculpatory."  342 S.C. 113, 117, 536 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2000). 
 
Rule 804(b)(3), SCRE, requires the trial judge to view the disputed evidence in light 
of the surrounding circumstances and discern whether each particular remark is 
plainly self-inculpatory.  This entails a searching examination of both content and 
context. 
 
Viewing Barnes' letter through this lens, we conclude it is replete with statements 
that do not directly incriminate him, but instead seek to curry favor with his mother 
or shift blame to Young.  Barnes assures his mother at least four times that his brother 
Troy's involvement was minimal (e.g., "Troy [] had nothing to do with it.  I should 
of told them that Troy really came down there to get me . . . . [Troy] said hell no 
don't go with [that] man . . . . I looked back and seen Troy waving his hand telling 
me to come back.").  Even the State in its closing acknowledged Barnes' underlying 
motivations in writing the letter, conceding he was "maybe trying [to] protect his 
brother" and "minimizing his own role."  The focus on downplaying Troy's role is 
significant, for in an earlier recorded statement that the trial court excluded, Barnes 
had told police  that he—and not Troy—had been the "lookout" for the two others 
who had gone inside the bakery.  This underscores the notorious unreliability 
common to statements implicating accomplices and why they by definition almost 
always fall outside the tight boundaries of Rule 804(b)(3).       
 
Barnes also paints himself in the letter as a reluctant participant manipulated by 
Young into the robbery and murder.  He repeatedly describes Young as the organizer 
and instigator, offering a "mere presence" defense for himself.  Once a declarant 
begins shifting blame to another, there is a corresponding shift away from the 
admissibility requirements of the rule.  See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603; McCormick 
on Evidence, § 319 at 534 (7th ed. 2013).  Like the declarant in Holmes, Barnes 
"repeatedly depicts himself as [being] caught up in the crime."  342 S.C. at 117 n.3, 
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536 S.E.2d at 673 n.3. Barnes wrote he was planning on spending the evening with 
his girlfriend, until bowing to Young's relentless pressure to accompany him on his 
planned robbery of the Ale House. When they found the Ale House closed, Barnes 
wrote "so I said come on let's go back to my house then [Young] said you see that 
lady over there . . . ." Barnes describes the fatal moment as orchestrated entirely by 
Young: "I got scared ma I didn't want to do it . . . I should never listen to [Young]."  
These blame-spreading remarks should have not been presented to the jury. Id.
("'Confessions' which shift blame to co-conspirators cannot reasonably be viewed as 
self-inculpatory."); see State v. Dinkins, 339 S.C. 597, 602, 529 S.E.2d 557, 559 (Ct. 
App. 2000) (attempts to absolve blame and other self-serving statements do not
qualify as statements against penal interest).           
Placing Barnes' statements in context does not translate into admitting the entire 
narrative to demonstrate the backdrop. There is no res gestae rider to  Rule  
804(b)(3). Nor can we accept the State's position that the entire letter, except the
references to Troy, is against Barnes' penal interest. To be sure, "a statement is not 
per se inadmissible simply because the declarant names another person." Fuller, 
337 S.C. at 245, 523 S.E.2d at 172.  Nevertheless, we have never found a statement 
in which a declarant implicates—rather than merely names—another admissible 
under Rule 804(b)(3). The rule only grants admission of statements against the 
declarant's penal interest. Statements that are against the penal interest of an 
accomplice do not qualify for the simple fact that the accomplice is not the declarant.  
To explain proper application of the rule, the Williamson Court furnished an 
illuminating example: 
[O]ther parts of his confession, especially the parts that 
implicated Williamson, did little to subject Harris himself 
to criminal liability. A reasonable person in Harris' 
position might even think that implicating someone else 
would decrease his practical exposure to criminal liability, 
at least so far as sentencing goes. Small fish in a big 
conspiracy often get shorter sentences than people who are 
running the whole show, especially if the small fish are 
willing to help the authorities catch the big ones. 
512 U.S. at 604 (citations omitted). The Court dismissed the position that "an entire 
narrative, including non-self-inculpatory parts (but excluding the clearly self-serving 
parts . . .), may be admissible if it is in the aggregate self-inculpatory." Id. at 601. 
See generally Weinstein's Federal Evidence, § 804.06 (4)(d) (2d ed. 2017) ("[A]
statement which shifts a greater share of the blame to another person (self-serving) 
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or which simply adds the name of a partner in the crime (neutral) should be excluded 
even when closely connected to a statement that assigns criminality to the
declarant.").  
The State also mischaracterizes Williamson as drawing a distinction between
statements made by Harris regarding the same criminal activity undertaken by both 
Harris and Williamson and statements by Harris about Williamson's "separate
criminal activity." Williamson does not say this. In his narrative confessions, Harris 
implicated both himself and Williamson in the same drug conspiracy; the opinion 
depicts no unilateral "separate" criminal conduct by Williamson. Williamson, 512 
U.S. at 596–97. The fact that Williamson's exposure to criminal prosecution was 
"separate" from Harris' is precisely what removed declarant Harris' statements 
implicating his accomplice Williamson from the rule: he had made a statement not
against his own penal interest, but against the interest of Williamson. Id. at 604. As 
Williamson noted:
The question under Rule 804(b)(3) is always whether the
statement was sufficiently against the declarant's penal 
interest "that a reasonable  person in the declarant's
position would not have made the statement unless 
believing it to be true," and this question can only be
answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances. 
Id.at 603–04; see also McCormick on Evidence, § 319 at 533 ("The result is that only 
the specific parts of the narrative that inculpate qualify."). 
Nor are we persuaded by the State's reliance on United States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 
643 (4th Cir. 2013). Dargan was tried separately for a robbery committed with two 
others. Id. at 645–46. The Fourth Circuit affirmed admission of a statement one of 
Dargan's co-defendants, Harvey, had made to a cellmate confessing to the crime and
mentioning his two accomplices without identifying them other than to say they were 
incarcerated in the same facility. Id. at 649–50. The court found the statements were 
against the declarant's penal interest and satisfied Rule 804(b)(3) because they 
demonstrated an insider's knowledge of the crime and exposed him to conspiracy 
liability. Id.
We are not convinced Dargan is compatible with Williamson. There is no "insider's
knowledge" exception to the hearsay rule. Dargan and other courts that see such a
mirage, see, e.g., United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 288 (7th Cir. 2014), 
may be misreading Williamson's reference to how otherwise neutral statements may, 
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depending on context, be self-inculpatory if they "give the police significant details 
about the crime." Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603. But this does not mean, as Justice 
Scalia's solo concurrence implies, that statements revealing inside knowledge of a 
crime are automatically admissible even if they implicate others besides the 
declarant. Id. at 605–07.
We also find it difficult to see how any of Harvey's remarks in Dargan, other than 
the admission of his own involvement, were individually self-inculpatory. One who 
says "I killed X and did it with Y" would certainly be subject to conspiracy liability, 
and the statement would also be admissible against the declarant in his separate trial 
as a statement of a party-opponent. But almost any remark implicating both the 
declarant and an accomplice in a joint crime also incriminates the declarant in a
conspiracy, and to use such logic to meet 804(b)(3) would be an end run around 
Williamson as well as render that decision unintelligible, as many of the statements 
the Court described as non-self-inculpatory to Harris surely connected him to  a  
conspiracy with Williamson.5 
Significantly, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) was amended in 2010 to require
that a statement against penal interest be "supported by corroborating circumstances 
that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that 
tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability." Our Rule 804(b)(3) only requires 
corroboration when the statement is offered to exculpate the accused. Because this 
protective layer of corroboration is not extended to statements offered by the State
to inculpate the accused, the need to rigorously restrict admission to plainly self-
inculpatory remarks in such circumstances is even more urgent. Confining the 
statement against interest exception to such declarations is consistent with the text 
of the rule and the wariness with which our courts have treated this strand of hearsay, 
which was altogether barred from admission in criminal trials until State v. Doctor, 
306 S.C. 527, 529–30, 413 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1992), and the adoption of the South 
Carolina Rules of Evidence in 1995.  Before that, the common law only tolerated it 
5 Rule 801(d)(2)(E), SCRE, classifies "a statement by a coconspirator of a party 
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy" as not hearsay. But remarks 
made by a co-conspirator once the conspiracy has ended or that do not advance the 
conspiracy's aims do not enjoy the same aura of reliability. Consequently, they are 
treated like any other hearsay, mirroring the treatment Rule 804(b)(3) accords the 
non-self-inculpatory statements of accomplices. See State v. Sims, 387 S.C. 557, 
566, 694 S.E.2d 9, 14 (2010) (finding co-conspirator statements that do not further 
the conspiracy but simply "spill the beans" inadmissible). 
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 in civil cases, and then only if the declarant was dead. See, e.g., Gilchrist v. Martin, 
8 S.C. Eq. 492 (1831).  
We find the trial court erred in admitting Barnes' letter without conducting the 
careful examination required by Rule 804(b)(3).  The portions of the letter that did 
not plainly inculpate Barnes were rank hearsay inadmissible against Young.   
 
 
III. 
 
We next consider whether the trial court cured the error by instructing the jury the 
next morning to not consider the letter against Young.   We start by presuming the 
cure worked, for we also presume juries follow their instructions.  See State v. 
Grovenstein, 335 S.C. 347, 353, 517 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1999); see also Richardson v. 
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (noting "the almost invariable assumption of the 
law that jurors follow their instructions").  This presumption has long been assailed, 
most famously by Justice Jackson's disdainful appraisal of "[t]he naive assumption 
that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, [which] all 
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."  Krulewitch v. United States, 
336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  Others have 
defended jurors' ability to perform their duties conscientiously.  See United States v. 
Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 1986) ("We are not quite so naive as to believe 
that telling jurors not to think about something will cause them to forget it, but we 
trust juries to behave responsibly and to put aside as considerations bearing on their 
judgment matters that the judge tells them to put aside."); see also Sklansky, 
Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 407, 424-28 (2013) 
(reviewing thirty-three empirical studies of the effect of limiting instructions on 
mock juries and contending instructions can be effective if prudently delivered).  
 
Limiting instructions are deemed to cure error unless "it is probable that, 
notwithstanding the instruction, the accused was prejudiced."  State v. Smith, 290 
S.C. 393, 395, 350 S.E.2d 923, 924 (1986).  The instruction given here was well-
crafted, as far as limiting instructions go, which is not far amidst the dense gravity 
of a Bruton-like error.6   Bruton held the admission, in a joint trial, of a nontestifying 
 
                                                 
  
  
 
  
6 We leave for another day the issue of what impact, if any, Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004) has on Bruton. Many federal circuits have found that because 
Crawford limited the reach of the Confrontation Clause to testimonial statements, 
Bruton no longer applies to the admission of non-testimonial statements in a joint 
trial. See Dargan, supra; United States v. Vasquez, 766 F.3d 373, 378–79 (5th Cir. 
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defendant's confession implicating a co-defendant violated the Confrontation 
Clause. 391 U.S. at 126. The Court then took the remarkable step of adopting a per
se rule that the violation could not be cured by a limiting instruction. Id. at 135–36.  
The Court found:
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury 
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the 
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the 
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot
be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the 
powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a
codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the 
defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint
trial. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Relying on this same language, our supreme court recently reaffirmed that a limiting 
instruction cannot fix a Bruton violation. State v. McDonald, 412 S.C. 133, 142, 771 
S.E.2d 840, 844 (2015). We perceive no practical difference between Bruton,
McDonald, and the wrongful admission of Barnes' letter against Young that would 
justify a different result. We do not believe the limiting instruction given here in a 
joint trial magically gains potency by labeling the error it was designed to target as 
inadmissible hearsay rather than lack of confrontation. The concepts are close  
cousins. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots.").  
Nor can we sensibly say the magnitude of prejudice varies with whether the tainted 
confession was testimonial or not. It was an out-of-court statement that came in as 
evidence against the accused without the benefit of cross-examination, and the 
limiting instruction could not take it out.       
IV. 
Having decided the error in admitting Barnes' hearsay statements was not cured, we 
must address whether it was nevertheless harmless. The improper admission of 
2014). Our focus is solely whether, on the record before us, the presumption that 
curative instructions work can, in a joint trial, withstand the admission of an out-of-
court statement by a nontestifying co-defendant that violates the hearsay rule.  Rules
801–805, SCRE.     
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hearsay is harmless when it could not have reasonably affected the result of the trial.
State v. Brewer, 411 S.C. 401, 408–09, 768 S.E.2d 656, 660 (2015). "No definite 
rule of law governs this finding; rather, the materiality and prejudicial character of 
the error must be determined from its relationship to the entire case." State v. 
Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985). For example, 
"[i]mproperly admitted hearsay which is merely cumulative to other evidence may
be viewed as harmless." State v. Jennings, 394 S.C. 473, 478, 716 S.E.2d 91, 93– 
94 (2011) (citing State v. Blackburn, 271 S.C. 324, 329, 247 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1978)).
If it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict, 
then the error may be deemed harmless. State v. Tapp, 398 S.C. 376, 389, 728 S.E.2d 
468, 475 (2012). 
While we have not based the error here on Bruton or other constitutional grounds,
the analysis for ascertaining the harmfulness of a Bruton error remains useful, and 
is not functionally different from  the  test for trial errors outlined above. The 
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is not per se reversible error.  
In McDonald and State v. Henson, 407 S.C. 154, 167, 754 S.E.2d 508, 515 (2014),
our supreme court quoted Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972): "In some 
cases the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial
effect of the codefendant's admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless 
error." Whether a Bruton error is harmless depends upon numerous factors including 
"the importance of the witness's testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the 
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and of course, the overall strength of the 
prosecution's case." State v. Jenkins, 322 S.C. 360, 364–65, 474 S.E.2d 812, 815 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
We recognize it may seem counter-intuitive to find the hearsay error so prejudiced 
Young that no curative instruction could save it, yet also find the error harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. We are also mindful that a confession (sometimes called
"the Queen of proofs") is among the most explosive and incriminating of evidence, 
and often profoundly impacts the jury. But it must be remembered that the jury also 
had before it three separate confessions made by Young himself rather than his 
accomplice. Although these statements were recounted by fellow prisoners facing 
serious pending charges, and whose motives and recall were questioned extensively, 
it was up to the jury to gauge credibility.  It is probable the collective impact of this
testimony was more damaging to Young than Barnes' letter, which after all was 
written by a minor in lockup to his mother. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 
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250, 254 (1969) (finding admission of two co-defendants' confessions in violation 
of Bruton harmless when Harrington also confessed and evidence of his guilt was 
overwhelming; "Our judgment must be based on our own reading of the record and
on what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the two confessions on the
minds of an average jury."). The statements attributed to Young by his fellow 
inmates were largely consistent with each other, and corroborated other key pieces
of the State's case. See Schneble, 405 U.S. at 431 (finding a Bruton violation to be 
harmless error when the "details of petitioner's [confession] were internally 
consistent, were corroborated by other objective evidence, and were not contradicted 
by any other evidence in the case"); accord McDonald, 412 S.C. at 143–44, 771 
S.E.2d at 845. We note McDonald found a limiting instruction wanting in light of 
Bruton, yet still found the Bruton error harmless.7 412 S.C. at 142–44, 771 S.E.2d 
at 844–45.
Although the decision dealt with a defendant's confession improperly admitted
against him in his separate trial, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 313 (1991), emphasized that a court  
conducting a harmless-error inquiry must appreciate the 
indelible impact a full confession may have on the trier of 
fact . . . . If the jury believes that a defendant has admitted 
the crime, it doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision 
on that evidence alone, without careful consideration of 
the other evidence in the case. Apart, perhaps, from a 
videotape of the crime, one would have difficulty finding 
evidence more damaging to a criminal defendant's plea of 
innocence. 
We have such a videotape here.  Three witnesses, including his mother, identified 
Barnes as one of the people on the video shooting at Hunnewell. Numerous 
witnesses placed Young together with Barnes at Barnes' mother's house shortly
before and after the crime occurred, wearing a red sweatshirt like that seen on the
video. This house was within walking distance of the scene. Donald Moore stated 
that Young had discussed his planned robbery of the Ale House and that Young had 
7 We understand that in Henson our supreme court found a Bruton error not to be 
harmless.  See Henson, 407 S.C. at 167, 754 S.E.2d at 515.  There, however, the 
evidence of guilt was not overwhelming.  Unlike the situation here, there was no 
physical evidence linking the defendant to the crime and he had not confessed to 
third parties. See id.
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a Glock .40. Three witnesses related confessions by Young that corroborated details 
from the video. Portions of the video were found on his cell phone, along with a
depiction of him brandishing what he described as a Glock .45. Shell casings from 
the scene matched the make and type as those found at Young's home. The gloves 
recovered from Young's home bore gunshot residue. Young's girlfriend observed 
him hiding a gun he described as a .45 when he arrived home a few hours after the 
murder, and she also heard his mother later warn him to get rid of the gun.    
We therefore find it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 
found Young guilty absent the error.8 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999).
To be sure, there are instances when the improper hearsay heard by the jury is so 
prominent that "[t]he reverberating clang of those accusatory words would drown all 
weaker sounds." Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933) (Cardozo, J.).  
But here there was a deafening drumbeat of substantial testimonial and physical 
evidence far more resonant than Barnes' letter.     
We do not make this finding lightly, but in keeping with the view that "[t]he
harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a 
criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, 
and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying 
fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial 
error." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (citation omitted); cf. 
Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1791 
(2017) (noting "some degree of procedural error is virtually inevitable in all but the 
most straightforward of criminal trials," but advocating reform of harmless error 
doctrine to account more for the nature of the right infringed by the trial error rather 
than its effect on result).  
We remain concerned—not to mention perplexed—by the State's use of evidence 
the Supreme Court forbade a generation ago in Williamson, and in a manner 
condemned a generation before that in Bruton. We echo Justice Kittredge's reminder 
of the "cautionary warning from almost three decades ago" that the State should seek 
the expediency of joint trials only after considering the often insoluble evidentiary 
8 In light of this disposition, we find that if any error occurred in denying Young's 
motion for a mistrial, it was also harmless. See State v. Howard, 296 S.C. 481, 485, 
374 S.E.2d 284, 286 (1988). 
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problems they pose. McDonald, 412 S.C. at 144 n.4, 771 S.E.2d at 845 n.4. These 
problems, as common as they are elementary, appear to have escaped the State's 
attention here. Although we have found Young's trial fundamentally fair, the State's 
decision to jointly try him with Barnes needlessly jeopardized that fairness.       
V. 
Because any error in his trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Young's 
convictions are affirmed. 
AFFIRMED. 

GEATHERS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
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